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Search and Seizure and the Exclusionary
Rule: A Re.-Examination in the
Wake of Mapp v. Ohio
Jack G. Day and Bernard A. Berkman
[Tracing the emergence of the federal exclusionary rule
from its constitutional origins, the authors document the grad-
ual extension of the fourth amendment's reach. Focusing par-
ticular attention upon Mapp v. Ohio, in which the Supreme
Court of the United States overruled Wolf v. Colorado and ap-
plied the exclusionary rule to the states through the fourteenth
amendment, the authors examine in detail the significance of
this decision with special regard to its effect on formerly non-
exclusionary states.-Ed.]
THE FACTS IN MAPP V. OHIO
In the late spring of 1957, the Cleveland Police broke into the home
of Dollree Mapp without a search warrant. That act unwittingly thrust
both the police and Miss Mapp onto the stage of constitutional history
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and assured for them the im-
mortality of an historic deci-
sion of the Supreme Court of
the United States.' In that de-
cision the federal rule of exclu-
sion 2 was applied to the evi-
dence found by state police and
used in a state court. For the
first time, a majority of the
Court held the rule to be a con-
stitutional requirement and
binding on the states.'
The chain of events lead-
ing to this constitutional high point were these:
1. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2. The substance of the exclusionary rule is that evidence resulting from an illegal search
or seizure will not be admissible on trial.
3. For the purposes of the federal-state relationship problems inherent in application of the
fourth and fourteenth amendments, distinctions between law enforcement officials of the state
and its local subdivisions are not significant. In discussing either municipal or state officials
the generic term "state officials" will be used interchangeably with "police," "policemen," or
"police officials."
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On May 23, 1957, the Cleveland Police came to the Dollree Mapp
home on information that a witness wanted for questioning with respect
to a bombing was hiding there and that policy information was also hid-
den in the house. Refused admittance unless they exhibited a search
warrant, the police watched the house for several hours but did not seek
entrance again until more police arrived.
At this point the officers forced their way in, and, although Miss
Mapp's attorney was outside the premises, the police would not let him
see her or enter the house.
When she demanded to see a search warrant, a paper was exhibited
by one of the officers which she seized. The "warrant" was recovered
after a struggle and disappeared from the case. No search warrant was
produced at the trial, nor was its absence ever explained.
Because of her "belligerence" in resisting the police efforts to recover
the "warrant," Miss Mapp was handcuffed, roughly used, taken upstairs
by force, where the officers searched her bedroom, her child's bedroom,
the rest of the second floor, rooms on the first floor and the basement.
The search included a dresser, a chest of drawers, a closet, suitcases, per-
sonal papers of Miss Mapp, a photograph album, and a trunk. This broad
effort ultimately uncovered obscene materials. Miss Mapp was arrested,
charged, and finally convicted of knowing possession and control of lewd
and lascivious books, pictures, and photographs in violation of Ohio Re-
vised Code section 2905.34.
The Ohio Supreme Court condemned the method of the search but
did not reverse on this issue because evidence illegally obtained was then
admissible in a state court.4 The conviction was affirmed and the case
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
In the highest court of the United States the judgment of the Su-
preme Court of Ohio was reversed, the ground for decision being that
the conviction rested on the results of an unreasonable search and seizure.
Four of the majority of five Justices reasoned that the fourth amendment
to the United States Constitution was applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment, and "that the exclusionary rule" is an "essential
part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments,"5 binding on the
states, and not just a rule of evidence.
4. State v. Mapp, 170 Ohio St. 427, 430-31, 166 N.E.2d 387, 389 (1960). The court based
its conclusion upon the holding in State v. Lindway, 131 Ohio St. 166, 2 NX..2d 490, cert.
denied, 299 U.S. 506 (1936). In Mapp a majority of the Supreme Court of Ohio voted to
reverse the conviction on the ground that Ohio Rev. Code section 2905.34 was unconstitu-
tional. However, the majority vote was not enough to reverse because the Constitution of
Ohio (Article IV, Section 2) requires a majority of all but one of the supreme court to declare
a statute unconstitutional where, as in Mapp, the court of appeals has ruled favorably on con-
stitutionality.
5. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961).
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Mr. Justice Black, the fifth member of the Mapp majority, remained
unpersuaded that the exclusionary rule was a constitutional requirement
of the fourth amendment "standing alone,"' but joined in the reversal
on the ground that:
Reflection on the problem ... has led me to conclude that when the
Fourth Amendment's ban against unreasonable searches and seizures is
considered together with the Fifth Amendment's ban against compelled
self-incrimination, a constitutional basis emerges which not only justifies
but actually requires the exclusionary rule.
7
THE SIGNIFICANCE AND PURPOSE OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Why such extended consideration of the conviction of one charged
with possessing "dirty" pictures?
The reasons for judicial concern over convictions based on illegal
searches and seizures ought not to be affected by the nature of the crime
or the character of the alleged criminal. Whether the offense is mild or
shocking or the defendant reprehensible or respectable is immaterial to
the constitutional issue. The rights of all are of one piece, as Mr. Justice
Frankfurter has pointed out:
Petty cases are ... calculated to make bad law. The impact of a sordid
little case is apt to obscure the implications of the generalizations to
which the case gives rise....
It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people.
And so, while . . . concerned . . . with a shabby defrauder, we must
deal with his case in the context of what are really the great themes
expressed by the Fourth Amendment.8
These great themes have their roots in this country's origins. The
founders were all too acutely aware of the evils of the general warrant
6. Id. at 661. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 39-40 (1949) (concurring opinion) :
"... the federal exclusionary rule is not a command of the Fourth Amendment but is a judi-
dally created rule of evidence which Congress might negate."
7. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 662 (1961). Mr. Justice Black has long contended that
the first provision of the fourteenth amendment was intended to make the whole Bill of
Rights applicable to the states. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68, 71-72 (1947)
(dissenting opinion).
The notion that the fourth amendment plus the fifth equals exclusion is but an echo and
implementation of the views of the Supreme Court in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886), which in turn endorsed Lord Camden's conclusions in Entick v. Carrington and Three
Other King's Messengers, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (1765). Among the propositions
in the Entick case deemed basic in Boyd was this one: "It is very certain, that the law obligeth
no man to accuse himself; because the necessary means of compelling self-accusation, falling
upon the innocent as well as the guilty, would be both cruel and unjust; and it would seem,
that search for evidence is disallowed upon the same principle. Then, too, the innocent would
be confounded with the guilty." Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. at 629.
8. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 68-69 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
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and the writs of assistance.' John Adams wrote of James Otis' argument
in Paxton's Case:10
American independence was then and there born .... Every man of a
crowded audience appeared to me to go away, as I did, ready to take
arms against writs of assistance.1'
Otis had attacked the general warrant in spirited language:
Every householder in this province, will necessarily become less secure
than he was before this writ had any existence among us; for by it,
a custom house officer, or ANY OTHER PERSON has power given
him... TO ENTER FORCEABLY into a DWELLING HOUSE, and
rifle every part of it where he shall PLEASE to suspect uncustomed
goods are lodged! - Will any man put so great a value on his free-
hold, after such power commences as he did before? - every man in
this province, will be liable to be insulted, by a petty officer, and
threatened to have his house ransack'd, unless he will comply with his
unreasonable and impudent demands: sic .... :s
No one argues that the force of history is such that the past ought to
hold the present in an iron grip. If the historical considerations giving
rise to the fourth amendment are no longer valid, then, of course, reason
may repudiate history. But has time so altered necessity, that Justice
Brandeis' evaluation of the historic reasons is no longer valid?
Protection against... invasion of "the sanctities of a man's home and the
privacies of life" was provided in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
by specific language . . . The makers of our Constitution undertook to
secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recog-
nized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of
his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satis-
faction of life are to be found in material things. They sought to
protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and
their sensations. They conferred, as against the government, the right
to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable
intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, what-
ever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. And the use, as evidence in a criminal proceeding, of facts
ascertained by such intrusions must be deemed a violation of the Fifth.la
(Emphasis added.)
9. In general warrants, the name of the person to be arrested was left blank. Both general
warrants and writs of assistance allowed the police to arrest and conduct searches on mere
suspicion, without the prior scrutiny of a judicial officer as to the probable cause for such
police actions. For an account of the attitude of the American colonists to such warrants see
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100-101 (1959), and especially the emphatic pronounce-
ments repeated there from early Declarations of Rights. See also the historical account written
by Frankfurter in Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 157-63 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
10. Quincy (Mass.) 51-57 (1761-72). (The report of Paxton's Case only summarizes Otis'
argument.).
11. 10 ADAMs, WORKs, 247-48 (1857).
12. The excerpt from Otis appears in an article in the Boston Gazette on January 4, 1762,
believed to have been written by Otis faithfully reporting his argument against the writs. The
article is reprinted in Quincy (Mass.), app. 488-94 (1761-72), excerpt at 489.
13. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473, 478-79 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
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No one should leave the high ground marked out by Justice Brandeis
for the uses of the fourth amendment. Hardly anyone would argue that
history is so irrelevant, times so changed, or values so pitted that the
right of privacy should be exposed to government intrusion unimpeded
by the fourth amendment. And yet a prosecutor still will argue that
warrants are designed only to protect policemen against a "suit for tres-
pass or against an action in tort," and that wicked people, that is crimi-
nals, have no right of privacy.14 The implicit premises of the opponents
of the exclusionary rule are (1) that the police must have a "free hand"
to combat criminal elements and (2) the police can be trusted to observe
the rights of law abiding people.
The answer to the first of these propositions is that those jurisdictions
holding police more strictly accountable manage a viable society.'" The
answer to the second is that experience proves the police cannot be trusted
to make the perceptive judgments essential to the preservation of fourth
amendment rights. This is a function of a judicial officer and it cannot
be safely delegated to law enforcement men,16 unless certain well defined
and narrow circumstances are present warranting an exception.'"
The fact patterns of the search, seizure, and arrest cases' demonstrate
the incredible lengths to which police departments have gone to secure
evidence and to make arrests. In virtually every instance in which a
conviction has been reversed for fourth amendment violations, the offend-
ing action by law officers has been taken without probable cause, or not
incident to a lawful arrest or beyond the permissible scope of searches.
But these conclusions came only after judicial review. This suggests that
judicial scrutiny before the commencement of the search (i.e., on the issue
of securing a warrant by a showing of probable cause) and the education
of the police to a greater consciousness of fourth amendment rights might
have resulted in legally unassailable convictions of those defendants
actually guilty. More importantly, it suggests that the invasion of the
privacy of those not guilty might never have occurred. Of course, it is
of scant comfort to the innocent victim that he goes free because uncon-
14. See petition for rehearing, p. 8, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (statement of Cuyahoga
County, Ohio, prosecuting attorney).
15. See discussion of the English approach to the conduct of criminal justice by Frankfurter
in Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 170-71 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
The federal jurisdiction in the United States affords an admirable example of an efficiently
working police system, notwithstanding the fact that its "free hand" has long been stayed by
the federal rule allowing the suppression or exclusion of evidence illegally acquired.
16. Justice Jackson has noted that this is a point "not grasped by zealous officers." The
protection lies in requiring the inferences of probable cause to be drawn by a "neutral and
detached magistrate" rather than an officer engaged in the "often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime." Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1947).
17. See pp. 76-89 infra.
18. Ibid.
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stitutional procedures have been used against him. The harm occurred
at the moment when such procedures were used.
Beyond this, if the touchstone of propriety is guilt, the process used
against "guilty" defendants will fix police methods. And no one will
have fourth amendment rights because the assertion of innocence will
never be made successful until after the illegal arrest, search, or seizure
has been made and the violation completed. The violation cannot be
called back. Therefore, it must be forestalled or the fourth amendment
protections will be futile:
[T]he right to be secure against searches and seizures is one of the
most difficult to protect. Since the officers are themselves the chief
invaders, there is no enforcement outside of court....
There may be, and I am convinced that there are, many unlawful
searches of homes and automobiles of innocent people which turn up
nothing incriminating, in which no arrest is made, about which courts
do nothing, and about which we never hear.
Courts can protect the innocent against such invasions only indirectly
and through the medium of excluding evidence.19
It is at this point that the Mapp case assumes its greatest significance.
For it adds a constitutional dimension to the rule of exclusion requiring
all law enforcement officers to give meaning in practice to the rights
guaranteed all persons by the fourth amendment. "The rule is calculated
to prevent, not to repair.""
The shaping of the law to this objective was not done on snap judg-
ment.2' It reflects, rather, long experience marked by searching ap-
praisals and reappraisals. The wavering course of the development of
the exclusionary rule and the many dissents strewn along the way testify
to this.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
The long history of the Mapp doctrine began with Boyd v. United
States.' In Boyd, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for new
trial a verdict and judgment of forfeiture to the United States. That
judgment had condemned thirty-five cases of glass seized for importation
into the United States in fraud of the custom laws. The importers had
19. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (dissenting opinion of Jackson, J.).
See also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217-18 (1960). By definition, a misused
innocent is not going to get his case before a court unless he initiates a suit against the offend-
ing policeman. On the futility of such remedies see the analysis of Justice Murphy in Wolf
v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 42-44 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
20. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
21. But cf. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 672 (1961) (dissenting opinion of Harlan, J.).
22. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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entered a claim for the goods stating that the forfeiture had not occurred
in the manner and form alleged.
On trial it became important to the government's case to show the
quantity and value of twenty-nine cases of glass previously imported.
The district attorney introduced an order of the district court directing
notice to and requiring the claimants to produce the invoice of the
twenty-nine cases.
The invoice was produced over claimants' objection to the validity
of the notice and to the constitutionality of the law on which it was
based. Failing at this juncture, the claimants opposed the introduction
of the invoice into evidence on trial on the ground that:
... in a suit for forfeiture, no evidence can be compelled from the
claimants themselves, and also that the statute, so far as it compels pro-
duction of evidence to be used against claimants is unconstitutional
and void.2 3
The decision upheld the claimants' contention and the opinion, by
implication, supported the view that Justice Black was to take seventy-
five years later in Mapp v. Ohio.24 Concluding that compulsory produc-
tion "of a man's private papers"25 in connection with the forfeiture of his
property was within the fourth amendment in all cases in "which a search
and seizure would be," the Boyd court asked:
Is a search and seizure, or . . .a compulsory production of a man's
private papers, to be used in evidence against him in a proceeding to
forfeit his property for alleged fraud against the revenue laws - is
such a proceeding for such a purpose an unreasonable search and
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the Consti-
tution? 26
Answering the question affirmatively, the Court concluded in a notable
passage:
The principles laid down in this fEntick v. Carringtont opinion affect
the very essence of constitutional liberty and security. They reach
farther than the concrete form of the case then before the court, with
its adventitious circumstances; they apply to all invasions on the part
of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home
and the privacies of life .... [Ajny forcible and compulsory extortion
of a man's own testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence
to convict him of crime or to forfeit his goods, is within the condemna-
tion of that judgment. In this regard the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
run almost into each other.27
23. Id. at 618.
24. 367 U.S. 643, 661-63 (1961). Black discusses the interrelationship of the fourth
and fifth amendments.
25. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1886).
26. id. at 622. Failure to produce would not have resulted in a search and seizure, but the
allegations which the Government affirmed the papers would prove were to "be taken as con-
fessed." Id. at 620.
27. Id. at 630; see also note 7 supra.
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The Boyd decision established the law of searches and seizures and
the admissibility of their product in the federal courts. Since 1886 the
Supreme Court of the United States has had repeated occasion to either
reaffirm or distinguish this decision but has never overruled it. Had some
prescience anticipated the gradual accretion of the specific rights of the
first eight amendments into the fourteenth,28 a process still going on as
Mapp proves, it might have been possible long ago to predict the Mapp
result with some assurance.
Nevertheless, because the accretion process had not even begun, much
less advanced to its state of existence immediately preceding Mapp, the
Court should have been able to distinguish the Boyd rule in Adams v.
New York29 on the ground of the inapplicability of the fourth amend-
ment to state action. But it did not decide that issue directly. Instead, the
Court went on to other considerations and said, perhaps unnecessarily to
the decision:
Furthermore, it is within the established power of the State to prescribe
the evidence which is to be received in the courts of its own govern-
ment.30
Thereafter, the decisional process in the Supreme Court of the United
States developed refinements of the federal exclusionary rule but on terms
which made the question whether its origins were constitutional or evi-
dential of no immediate practical importance in federal cases.3 '
Twenty-eight years after Boyd v. United States," the Court de-
cided Weeks v. United States33 which with Boyd became a "scripture" of
search and seizure problems in the federal jurisdiction.
Defendant Weeks was convicted of unlawful use of the mails to con-
duct a lottery. Papers and articles secured solely by state police officers
and turned over to a United States marshal, and the letters and envelopes
28. Beginning with a dictum in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
29. 192 U.S. 585 (1904). According to the Court, the sole question was whether "certain
private papers" found in the execution of a search warrant "which had a legal purpose in the
attempt to find gambling paraphernalia," were "competent evidence against the accused." The
question was answered in the affirmative, apparently on three grounds: (1) there was no un-
reasonable search or seizure and therefore no constitutional question; (2) even if the private
papers had been illegally taken this was no impediment to their admissibility if pertinent to the
issue, for the court will not inquire how the evidence was obtained; (3) it is within the power
of the state to determine what evidence will be received in its own courts. 192 U.S. at 594-95,
597, 599.
30. Id. at 599. But see National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 232 U.S. 58, 71 (1914): "The
objection that the act, in directing the state officers to inspect the contents of the box, operates
as an unreasonable search and seizure raises no Federal question, since the prohibition on that
subject in the Fourth Amendment, does not apply to the states. Ohio ex rel. Lloyd v. Dollison,
194 U.S. 445, 447."
31. The federal rule was applied if a basis for it existed, irrespective of whether exclusion
was to be considered a constitutional or evidential requirement.
32. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
33. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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acquired by the independent action of the marshal, but in company with
the police, were introduced at his trial.3"
The evidence procured by state officers resulted from a search of the
defendant's house in his absence and without a warrant. Entrance was
accomplished by use of a key pointed out by a neighbor. The United
States Marshal's actions followed admission in response to his rap on the
door. Without process of any kind he searched the defendant's room,
including a drawer where he found letters written to Weeks with respect
to the lottery.
Defendant's conviction was reversed and remanded for a new trial on
the ground that error had been committed both in not ordering the
papers restored to him and in permitting their use on trial.
It was held that the state police officers had not acted under federal
authority so as to make the fourth amendment applicable to the seizure
by them. Nor would the Court inquire what remedies might be availa-
ble against the individual state officers, the fourth amendment not being
directed against individual action. But the amendment did reach the
United States government and its agents, according to the Court. Its
marshal having acted under color of his office in violation of the consti-
tutional rights of the defendant, the evidence procured by him could not
be used to convict. The letters seized by the marshal should have been
returned to the defendant upon his seasonable application.8"
The Weeks case is remarkable for its reliance on the fourth amend-
ment alone as the basis for exclusion,36 for its application of the ex-
clusionary rule only to the officers of the United States government (the
state officials did not claim to be acting under federal authority so as to
make the fourth amendment applicable to their illegal seizures) and for
its conclusion that the fourth amendment was not aimed at individual
misconduct.3 7
The significance of Weeks in relation to Adams v. New York 8 lies
in the fact that, under the theory of the Weeks doctrine, even had the
Adams evidence been held to have been illegally acquired by the state
officers, it could have been properly used on trial - in the federal juris-
diction adhering to the exclusionary rule (Weeks) and in a state jurisdic-
34. The defense made the necessary and seasonable moves to save their objections to the
methods used in acquiring the evidence and its use on trial. In all cases discussed hereafter,
it may be assumed, in the absence of a contrary indication, that the objections to the search
and seizures involved have been similarly or, at least, sufficiently protected.
35. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
36. The fifth amendment was not mentioned in the opinion as a basis for decision. It was
discussed, but briefly, and then mainly in connection with defendant Weeks' claim that his
fifth as well as his fourth amendment rights had been violated. Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 (1914).
37. Accord, Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
38. 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
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tion abjuring the rule (Adams). The inapplicability of the fourth amend-
ment to the illegal state action, as the Weeks court viewed the scope of
the amendment, would have rationalized the result.
The rule announced in Weeks for the exclusion of evidence from a
federal trial because illegally seized by federal officers was followed and
extended to the illegal seizure of corporate papers in the circumstances
of Silverthorne Lumber Co., Inc. v. United States. 9
In Burdeau v. McDowell," where two thieves "blew" two safes,
forced open a desk to get at the private papers of the accused, and turned
them over to United States government officials who, in turn, used them
in a federal trial, such conduct was held insufficient to bring the rule of
exclusion into play. The initial search had been carried out by private
individuals.
The theoretical justification was obvious enough. The fourth amend-
ment simply does not apply to private individuals. And the govern-
mental officials who used the evidence were in no way involved in its
unlawful acquisition. Justice Brandeis, with whom Justice Holmes con-
curred, would have restored the papers to their accused owner and would
not have permitted them to be used on trial. Apparently, the Brandeis-
Holmes thesis was that the standards which the court has the power to
establish for the administration of justice in federal courts may go be-
yond bare constitutional requirements because governmental officials
have no exceptional position before the law:
Respect for law will not be advanced by resort, in its enforcement, to
means which shock the common man's sense of decency and fair play.41
In 1927, in Byars v. United State 2 a federal officer participated
actively in an illegal search instigated by state officers under a warrant
"dearly ... bad if tested by the Fourth Amendment." The evidence
seized, counterfeit stamps of the kind used for whiskey bottled in bond,
was found partly by the federal agent and partly by the state officers. All
of it was turned over to the federal official and used on the trial of the
defendant in a federal court for illegal possession of counterfeit stamps
with fraudulent intent. His conviction was reversed.
The Supreme Court pointed out that a search in contravention of the
Constitution was not validated by what it brought to light. Nor could
39. 251 U.S. 385 (1920). Cf. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 75-6 (1906). But see Essgee
Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 151 (1923).
40. 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
41. Id. at 477. This theme was discussed also in the dissents of Holmes and Brandeis in
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469-70, 485 (1928). See also McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). Such an approach provides a theoretical basis for widened
federal supervision of searches and seizures but has not been widely utilized in this connec-
tion. But see Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1946).
42. 273 U.S. 28, 29 (1927).
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evidence illegally obtained be used to convict in a federal prosecution.
Noting that mere participation by a federal officer would not so trans-
mute a state search as to make it a federal undertaking and bring it within
the fourth amendment and the federal exclusionary rule, the Court held
the facts respecting the agent's participation in this particular case did
just that:
The attendant facts here reasonably suggest that the federal prohibition
agent was not invited to join the state squad as a private person might
have been, but was asked to participate and did participate as a federal
enforcement officer, upon the chance, which was subsequently realized,
that something would be disclosed of official interest to him as such
agent....
We cannot avoid the conclusion that the participation of the agent in
the search was under color of his federal office and that the search in
substance and effect was a joint operation of the local and federal of-
ficers. In that view,... the effect is the same as though he had engaged
in the undertaking as one exclusively his own.43
So the shadow of the federal exclusionary rule became a little longer.
The shadow lengthened again, however slightly, in Lustig v. United
States.44 Here a considerably lesser participation by a federal agent than
that involved in Byars was enough to invoke the rule. In addition, the
majority announced the famous "silver platter" dictum.
In Lustig although the federal agent was engaged in some keyhole
peeping, he did not initiate or participate in a search of the room until
local police officials conducting the search without a warrant turned up
evidence of counterfeiting and sent word to him. The federal agent then
became active, going to the hotel to examine the evidence. When the
occupants of the room (one of whom was the defendant) appeared, they
were arrested and a search of their persons by the police began with the
federal agent present. That part of the yield from the search of the
persons which seemed to bear on counterfeiting was turned over to the
federal agent immediately. Eventually the whole product of the search
was given to him and used to convict the defendant in a federal prosecution
for violation of the counterfeiting statutes.
Accepting the findings of fact in the trial court, the Supreme Court
nevertheless reviewed their constitutional significance.45 Among those
facts were these: the federal agent was not a moving force in the search
and it was not undertaken by the state officers to help enforce federal
law.
Upsetting the conviction, the Court ruled that the federal agent's
selection of part of the evidence during the search for use in the prosecu-
43. Id. at 32-33.
44. 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
45. Id. at 77-78.
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don was not severable from the rest of the search. Indeed, there was no
difference between participation in an illegal search from the outset and
joining it during its course. To qualify for use in a federal trial after
acquisition from an illegal search, the evidence had to be untainted by
federal hands:
The crux ... is that a search is a search by a federal officer if he had
a hand in it; it is not a search by a federal officer if evidence secured
by state authorities is turned over to the federal authorities on a silver
platter.46
The "silver platter" doctrine, of course, could not qualify the evidence in
Lustig. Federal participation prevented that4
A "pure" example of state action, unconstitutional by the standards
imposed by the fourth amendment, occurred in Gambino v. United
States,48 a case decided the same year as Byars.4" The issue in Gambino
was the question of the applicability of the exclusionary rule to evidence
illegally seized by state officers engaged solely in the enforcement of
federal law. Convictions for conspiracy to import and transport liquor in
violation of the National Prohibition Act were secured after New York
state troopers, acting entirely without federal assistance, arrested Gam-
bino and another in an automobile near the New York-Canadian border.
Following the arrest, the automobile was searched and intoxicating liquor
and other property found in it were seized. No warrant was ever pro-
cured.
Holding that the evidence had been wrongfully obtained, the Court
took up the question whether the relation of the state troopers to the
federal prosecution was such that the evidence illegally seized by them
should have been excluded from the trial. Despite its judgment that the
state troopers were not within the federal statutory phrase, "any officer of
the law," as that term was used in defining governmental officials re-
sponsible for the enforcement of the National Prohibition Act,"0 so as
to make them agents of the United States, the convictions were reversed.
The New York state prohibition act had been repealed and there was
46. Id. at 78-79.
47. Cf. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). There the Court refused to consider
the effect of the introduction of that part of the evidence secured by state police action on
the ground of the inapplicability of the fourth amendment to state officers not acting under
federal authority. The implications of this are in accord with the theory of the "silver platter"
dictum. However, in Weeks too the illegal federal action tainted the conviction resulting in
reversal. There was no "pure' state illegality.
48. 275 U.S. 310 (1927).
49. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
50. Although the Court determined that the National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, tit. II, § 2,
41 Stat. 305, 308 (1919), contemplated some cooperation in enforcement between federal
and state officers, it considered that only federal officers were within the phrase "any officer
of the law." Had the Court been able to find the state officers also within the phrase, then
the case might have been rationalized on the same terms as any other federal action case.
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no state offense in which the defendants were involved, present or past, or
any indication that the officers thought them so involved at the time of
their arrest. It followed, according to the Court, that the officers were
acting solely to enforce the National Prohibition Act. This conclusion
was important to the rationale of the opinion. It was used to explain
away any ostensible conflicts with prior decisions of the Court:
The conclusion here reached is not in conflict with any of the earlier
decisions of this Court in which evidence wrongfully secured by persons
other than federal officers has been held admissible in prosecutions for
Federal crimes. For in none of those cases did it appear that the search
and seizure was made solely for the purpose of aiding the United States
in the enforcement of its law.51
The evidence did not survive the exclusionary rule and the fourth
amendment's prohibition because the arrest and the search and seizure in
question were deemed to have been done solely to enforce federal law.
And the use of the evidence constituted ratification by the United States.5"
Another "pure" example of unassisted state action yielding constitu-
tionally "tainted" evidence for a federal prosecution occurred in 1960 in
Elkins v. United States,53 and resulted in the rejection of the "silver
platter" doctrine.
The holding was based on the theory that Wolf v. Colorado' had
transported the fourth amendment strictures on unreasonable searches
and seizures into the due process clause of the fourteenth, undercutting
the justification for admitting, in federal prosecutions, evidence uncon-
stitutionally procured by state officials.55
Indeed, there appear to have been few, if any, "silver platter" cases
decided in the Supreme Court of the United States, in "pure" form, that
is, with no interposition of federal officers, in which the doctrine has been
applied to sustain a federal conviction resting on tainted evidence pro-
cured solely by state officers.56 However, inferior federal courts have
sustained convictions on such evidence."
51. Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310, 317 (1927).
52. The ratification thesis is set forth in Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. at 316-17:
"The prosecution ... instituted by the federal authorities was, as conducted, in effect a ratifi-
cation of the arrest, search and seizure made by the troopers on behalf of the United
States .. ." According to this thesis the federal exclusionary rule should apply to any use
of evidence in a federal prosecution if that evidence had been illegally seized by state officials
even though not in pursuit of a singular federal purpose.
53. 364 U.S. 206 (1960). See also Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960), decided
the same day.
54. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
55. See note 67 infra.
56. Cf. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948), where Di Re was arrested and his
person searched without a warrant by a state officer accompanied by a federal agent who had
no power of arrest. At the trial which convicted Di Re, counterfeit gasoline ration coupons
along with counterfeit fuel oil coupons found during the search were admitted in evidence
over objection. Finding no federal rule justifying this search, the Court looked to state law
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In Rea v. United States, 8 the Court approved intervention by in-
junction to prevent the use of evidence in a state criminal trial after it
had been suppressed in a federal prosecution because of an unconstitu-
tional acquisition. But this was done without reference to any consti-
tutional principle. On other occasions, a restrained discretion, based
largely upon considerations relevant to federal-state relations policy, had
persuaded the Court to stay out of such situations."9 Not so in Rea.6"
to determine whether the search of Di Re without a warrant was valid. Determining that
state law did not supply a reason for arrest without a warrant under the circumstances, the
reversal of the conviction by the appellate court below was affirmed. The Court did not
rely upon either the participation of the federal officer or the state officer's enforcement of
federal law only as the basis for invalidating the admission of the evidence. A decision based
on either factor, coupled with an unlawful search and seizure, would have found support in
prior decisions by the Court. See also Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1947), where
state and federal officers' commingled efforts resulted in illegal gathering of evidence which
was later used in a federal prosecution. The conviction was reversed. But see Center v.
United States, 267 U.S. 575 (1925) (per curiam), where a federal conviction was affirmed,
based on Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921) (see note 40 supra and accom-
panying text). However, the Brief for the United States (pp. 1-2) stated the issue: 'The
sole question involved is whether in a Federal Prosecution under the National Prohibition Act
the testimony of local police to facts obtained by them while acting under State law, through
an alleged unlawful search and seizure, but without collusion with or at the instance of
Federal officers, is open to the objection that such testimony violates the constitutional im-
munity of the defendant from unreasonable search and seizure." Plaintiff in Error's Statement
Of The Case supports the Government's definition of the issue. Brief for Appellant, pp. 3-4,
256 U.S. 465 (1921). Cf. Dodge v. United States, 272 U.S. 530 (1926). Feldman v.
United States, 322 U.S. 487, 489 (1944), provides an example only by analogy because the
application of the fifth amendment was involved in that case.
57. Anderson v. United States, 237 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1956); Parker v. United States, 183
F.2d 268 (9th Cir. 1950); Gilbert v. United States, 163 F.2d 325 (10th Cir. 1947).
58. 350 U.S. 214 (1956).
59. See Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951), where it was said, in response to the
argument that the Civil Rights Act provided a basis for injunctive prohibition of use of evi-
dence claimed to have been obtained by an unlawful search by state police, .that the Civil
Rights Act should be construed to respect the "proper balance between the States and Federal
Government in law enforcement." There was no irreparable injury and: "... to sanction this
intervention ... would expose every state criminal prosecution to insupportable disruption.
Every question of procedural due process of law . . . would invisage a flanking movement
against the system of State courts by resort to the federal forum, with review if need be to
this court, to determine the issue." 342 U.S. at 123. See also a recent opinion in Pugach v.
Dollinger, 364 U.S. 458 (1961) (per curiam) affirming refusal of an injunction against
use of wire tap evidence in a state trial. State officials had allegedly made the taps. The
affirmance was one sentence long and cited both Stefanelli v. Minard, supra, and Schwartz v.
Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952) (where a state wire tap in violation of the Federal Communica-
tions Act did not upset a state conviction).
In Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381 (1961), the refusal of an injunction to impound
seized narcotics, prevent their use on trial and enjoin the respondents (federal narcotics
agents) from testifying in a state prosecution was affirmed. Justice Douglas, with whom the
Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Brennan concurred, dissented. For the dissenters Rea v. United
States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956) was controlling.
In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), the Court found a cause of action for damages
sufficiently stated under the Civil Rights Act, 17 Stat. 27 (1866), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1957).
Among other things, outrageous violations of the house and persons of the complainants by
members of the Chicago police force were alleged. The deprivation of a constitutional right
under color of state authority, upon whiqh the complaint was based, was claimed to be an
unreasonable search and seizure. This was a well founded claim, according to the majority,
because Wolf v. Colorado, 388 U.S. 25 (1949), and Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206
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There the majority based its conclusions upon the supervisory power
that the Supreme Court wields over "federal law enforcement agencies."
A federal agent had violated the rules prescribed by the Court to govern
federal criminal procedure. The power of the federal courts encom-
passes the policing of such rules to insure their observance.6' And, in
any event, the injunction was not sought against, and would not apply
to, any state official. Only the offending federal agent would be en-
joined from proffering his tainted evidence to the state prosecutor.
Although the theory of Rea is "supervision," there is an aura about
the result which suggests a repudiation of the obverse of the "silver plat-
ter" theorem - that is, a federal officer cannot hand tainted evidence to
state law enforcement officers on a "silver platter."
Chronologically ahead of the problems dealt with in Rea, the issue
of federal-state relationships, as touched by the fourth amendment and
the exclusionary rule, had reached a peak in Wolf v. Colorado.2 At
least that seems to have been the conclusion of Justice Frankfurter, who
wrote the majority opinion.
The case report for Wolf in the Supreme Court contains a minimum
of facts. But the precise question posed and stated there was this:
Does a conviction by a State court for a State offense deny the "due
process of law" required by the Fourteenth Amendment, solely because
evidence that was admitted at the trial was obtained under circumstances
which would have rendered it inadmissible in a prosecution for violation
of a federal law in a court of the United States because there deemed
to be an infraction of the Fourth Amendment as applied in Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383?63
Rejecting the notion that the "'due process of law' guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment is shorthand for the first eight amendments,"
and noting the Court's repeated rejections of that proposition, Mr. Jus-
tice Frankfurter concluded: "The issue is closed."64  A remarkably un-
prophetic remark, even without the hindsight provided by Mapp v.
Ohio.65 The very decision in hand moved the right to privacy, "which
(1960), have made the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures in the fourth
amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See note 67 infra.
60. Justice Harlan, with whom three justices joined, dissented on the grounds that this case
represented a new departure in suggesting the right to supervise federal law enforcement
officers (an executive function), that there may have been power to issue the injunction but
discretion called for contrary action or the decision could not be reconciled with Stefanelli v.
Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951), and that under Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), a
state could adopt an exclusionary rule or not as it saw fit. 350 U.S. 214, 218-21 (1956).
61. Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 217 (1956).
62. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
63. Id. at 25-26.
64. Id. at 26.
65. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The movement of first amendment rights into the protection of
the fourteenth since Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925), and the instances in
which specific rights equivalent to those in one or another of the first eight amendments
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is at the core of the Fourth Amendment" and "implicit in the 'concept
of ordered liberty,"' within the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment."8
To be sure, the majority opinion in Wolf was not in fact as broadly
inclusive as it came to be interpreted," and it did not vouchsafe the exclu-
sionary rule a constitutional status (exclusion was not "an essential in-
gredient of the right") but left it with the intimation that it was a judi-
dally created rule of evidence which Congress might change.6" Accord-
ingly, protection of the right to privacy from local police invasion was
left to such remedies as the laws of the various states might devise, plus
the pressure which public opinion in the local community might exert
against oppressive police conduct. 9
Between the Wolf decision in 1949 and Elkins in 1960, a significant
case, full of portent for the future of the exclusionary rule, appeared.
That case, Irvine v. California," concerned an aggravated invasion of
privacy by local police. The circumstances surrounding the search led
the majority to comment that "few police measures have come to our at-
tendon that more flagrantly, deliberately, and persistently violated the
fundamental principle declared by the fourth amendment"; in fact, the
invasion of privacy, the Court said, "would be almost incredible if it were
not admitted" at the trial by the police themselves. 1
have been put within the protection of the fourteenth amendment were certainly known to the
majority. Moreover, the tone and number of separate and concurring opinions in the Wolf
case were a signal for caution.
Some examples of specific or equivalent rights to those in the first eight amendments
being drawn under the fourteenth include: assistance of counsel [sixth amendment] to meet
the fair trial requirements of the due process clause, see Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932); the privilege against self-incrimination [fifth amendment] in coerced confession cases,
although not specifically applied, see Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), Chambers
v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) and Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 237 (1941) (dic-
tum); just compensation requirement [fifth amendment] in state eminent domain cases, see
Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 105 (1877), cf. Chicago, B. & 0. Ry. v. Chicago, 166
U.S. 226, 233, 236-37, 241 (1897).
66. Wolf v. Colorado, 388 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949).
67. See, e.g., the statements of Justice Douglas in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171
(1961) (actually decided on February 20, 1961 approximately four months before Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); "TMhe guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures
contained in the Fourth Amendment has been made applicable to the States by reason of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25; Elkins
v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213." Justice Stewart in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206, 213 (1960), stated: 'Then came Wolf v. Colorado.... There it was unequivocally
determined by a unanimous court that the Federal Constitution, by virtue of the Fourteenth
Amendment, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by state officers."
68. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949).
69. After reading Mr. Justice Murphy's conclusions respecting the ineffectiveness of remedies
available to victims of police lawlessness, Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. at 42-44 (dissenting
opinion), it is a temptation not to remind the Wolf majority of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
admonition in Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 52 (1949): "And there comes a point where
this court should not be ignorant as judges of what we know as men."
70. 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
71. Id. at 132.
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The police suspected the defendant of illegal gambling activity and
had a locksmith duplicate the key to his house while he was absent from
home. Using this key the officers with virtually unparalleled zeal entered
the house, installed a listening device in the hallway, bored holes in the
roof and strung wires to a nearby garage where police listeners were
posted. From time to time over a period of weeks, additional surrepti-
tious entries were made for the purpose of shifting the device. From
the hall it was moved to the bedroom, and after that it was installed in
a closet until the incriminating evidence was secured. The evidence was
admitted on trial in the state prosecution and the defendant was con-
victed.
Justices Douglas and Black would have reversed on the ground that
a gambling stamp required by federal law was introduced in evidence in
the state trial in violation of the fifth amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination. Justice Frankfurter would have looked to the Rochin72
principle to overturn the conviction.
But the majority was unpersuaded.73 Shocked by the police action, it
affirmed the conviction nevertheless. Rochin" was distinguished from
Irvine by the lack of violence. The police action was roundly con-
demned75 but since the rule of Wolf 6 imported the right of privacy into
the fourteenth amendment but not the subsidiary and evidentiary rule of
exclusion, the state conviction could not be touched. And the defendant
was left to local remedies or those provided by the Civil Rights Act.77
Of the efficacy of the exclusionary rule, the majority said:
That the rule of exclusion and reversal results in the escape of guilty
persons is more capable of demonstration than that it deters invasions
of right by the police.78
But one concurring member of the majority, Justice Clark, was not con-
vinced. And, since he is not a Justice ordinarily identified with the strong
personal rights bloc on the court, his views boded ill for the view that
the fourth amendment guarantees against unreasonable searches and sei-
72. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (see note 232 infra and accompanying text).
73. It will be remembered that Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) involved the
use of illegally obtained evidence in a federal prosecution.
74. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
75. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 132 (1954).
76. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
77. 62 Stat. 696 (1948), 17 U.S.C. § 242 (Supp. 1948) (criminal). Justice Douglas
took a dim view of the available remedies under the Civil Rights Act in the light of Screws
v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (dissenting opinion), but at that time Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167 (1961), an action for damages, had not been decided. But it is doubtful, even
in the light of Monroe, that Justice Douglas's stout views on personal rights would allow him
to embrace a remedy after the fact as an alternative to the exclusionary rule and discard the
rule that he regards as a preventive measure. See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 151-52
(1954) (dissenting opinion of Douglas, J.).
78. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954).
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zures did not include the exclusionary rule as a matter of constitutional
right. In his concurring opinion he said:
Had I been here in 1949 when Wolf was decided, I would have ap-
plied the doctrine of Weeks v. United States, . . . to the states. But
the Court refused to do so then, and it still refuses today. Thus Wolf
remains the law and, as such, is entitled to the respect of this Court's
membership.... In light of the "incredible" activity of the police here,
it is with great reluctance that I follow Wolf. Perhaps strict adherence
to the tenor of that decision may produce needed converts for its extinc-
tion. Thus I merely concur in the judgment of affirmance.j 9
This premonitory language gains particular significance in the light
of the Elkins case,s" decided six years later, where five Justices, not in-
cluding Justice Clark, joined to widen the scope of the exclusionary rule.
With Elkins, all evidence acquired in violation of the fourth amend-
ment was banished except in one narrow circumstance - the ring was
left open only to evidence secured in an illegal search and seizure con-
ducted exclusively by state officials for use in a state prosecution."1 The
shocking example of Irvine had made the eventual elimination of the re-
maining exception inevitable. It became apparent with Elkins that at
some early opportunity the Court was going to couple the substantive con-
stitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures with an
effective remedy against state action. The obvious method was to hold
the exclusionary rule to be a constitutional rule - an implicit part of the
fourth amendment which, in other respects, already bound the states
through the fourteenth.
Mapp v. Ohio82 supplied the occasion. The Court closed the ring.
THE IMPACT OF MAPP: SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
UNDER THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
In the wake of the sweeping opinion in Mapp v. Ohio' which over-
ruled Wolf v,. Colorado" in applying the federal exclusionary rule to the
states, the law enforcement authorities of those states which, until now,
79. Id. at 138-39.
80. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). Justice Clark's dissent in Elkins is in-
explicable in the light of his position in Irvine unless it be that he was still of a mind to follow
the rules announced in earlier cases until such time as there was a forthright adoption of the
exclusionary rule as a constitutional principle.
81. Another possible "opening" is not, as the law now stands, within the province of the
fourth amendment and therefore is not, strictly speaking, an exception. See Schwartz v. Texas,
344 U.S. 199 (1952).
82. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
83. 367 U.S. 343, (1961).
84. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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have been unencumbered by the rule 5 are currently facing the conse-
quences of Mapp with something less than equanimity. Their com-
plaints are marked by frequency, if not by novelty."6 Perhaps they have
cried "Wolf"' once too often.
In any event, the police, the courts, the prosecutors, and defense law-
yers in these states will be faced with legal problems which are new to
them, questions from which they have heretofore been insulated by the
expansiveness of their state rules of admissibility of illegally obtained
evidence:
(1) When is a search and seizure lawful?
(2) Under what circumstances does an accused have standing to
assert a constitutional violation?
(3) What is the breadth of the application of the exclusionary
rule?
These questions will be considered in the pages which follow by an
examination of the holdings of the United States Supreme Court and the
experience of the federal courts and state jurisdictions which followed the
exclusionary rule before Mapp v. Ohio. s Emphasis will be upon the
decisions of the Supreme Court, because that tribunal will be the final
arbiter of search and seizure questions under Mapp, where the conduct
85. The states which, until Mapp v. Ohio, held without qualification that illegally seized
evidence was admissible in a state criminal prosecution were: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado,
Connecticut, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsyl-
vania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont and Virginia. Alabama admitted such
evidence in all but searches and seizures of private dwellings for prohibited liquor, Maryland
followed the rule of admissibility of such evidence as to felonies only. See annor., 50 A.LR.2d
531, 543 (1956); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, App., at 224-32 (1960).
86. The common cry of the police is that strict adherence to constitutional procedure limits
or destroys their effectiveness: Their response to Mapp v. Ohio was typical. Immediately
after the Mapp decision was announced, the police officer responsible for the search which was
characterized by the Ohio Supreme Court as "such as to offend a sense of justice," 170 Ohio St.
427, 431 (1960), said the decision was "devastating." "If they're going to be that technical,
that ties our hands in law enforcement." Cleveland Press, June 20, 1961, § A, p. 4, col. 3.
See Cleveland Press, July 4, 1961, § C, p. 6, col. 5, in which the police and the county proce-
cutor point out that "police work would be made more difficult by the decision in the ...
Dollree Mapp case." Compare this reaction with that of the local law enforcement authorities
to People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955) which adopted the exclusionary rule
in California. See Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches - A Comment
on People v. Cahan, 43 CAL. L. REV. 565, 567 (1955): "The chief of police in the City of
Los Angeles stated that '[the decision is] a terrible blow to law enforcement.... With these
further restrictions being placed upon us - what are we going to do?'"
87. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
88. In addition to the federal jurisdiction, the states which followed the exclusionary rule
prior to Mapp v. Ohio were: Alaska, California, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyom-
ing. See Annot., 50 A.L.A.2d 531, 556 (1956).
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of state officers is in issue, despite what the highest court of a state may
hold.8"
The cases in the realm of search and seizure are riotous with dissent.
On similar, and sometimes indistinguishable facts, the results are fre-
quently irreconcilable. In the words of Justice Frankfurter:
The course of true law pertaining to search and seizures . . . has not
- to put it mildly - run smooth.... It is disastrous to law enforce-
ment to leave at large the inconsistent rules laid down in these cases....
It turns crime detection into a game of "cops and robbers."90
The reasons for such disparate judicial opinion are not obscure. The
cases reflect the need to consider several socially desirable objectives
which are sometimes in conflict. As Justice Cardozo has stated them:
On the one side is the social need that crime shall be repressed. On
the other, the social need that law will not be flouted by the insolence
of office.9 '
The various political philosophies of the judges, their attitudes about the
relative importance of the rights guranteed by the fourth amendment 2
to a free and open society, and their concern with the problems of law
enforcement explain, even if they do not clarify, the often conflicting
results.
As Mr. Justice Frankfurter has put it:
It is true... of journeys in the law that the place you reach depends
upon the direction you are taking. And so, where one comes out on
the case depends upon where one goes in... It makes all the difference
in the world whether one recognizes the central fact about the Fourth
Amendment, namely that it was the safeguard against recurrence of
abuses so deeply felt by the Colonies as to be one of the prime causes
of the Revolution, or one thinks of it as merely a requirement for a
piece of paper.93
Taking into account the various judicial attitudes toward the breadth,
scope, and importance of the right against illegal search and seizure, there
are certain principles which may be extracted from the decided cases.
These are examined below.
89. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224 (1960). "In determining whether there
has been an unreasonable search and seizure by state officers, a federal court must make
an independent inquiry, whether or not there has been such an inquiry by a State Court, and
irrespective of how any such inquiry may have turned out." (Emphasis added.)
90. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (concurring opinion of Frankfur-
ter, J.).
91. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 24, 150 N.E. 585, 589 (1926) (Cardozo, J.).
92. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
93. Rabinowitz v. United States, 339 U.S. 56, 60 (1950) (dissenting opinion of Frank-
furter, J.).
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WHEN IS A SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAWFUL?
What Is a Search and Seizure?
The courts have frequently been faced with the basic question: what
is a "search and seizure" within the meaning of the fourth amendment?
"A search implies some exploratory investigation or an invasion and
quest, a looking for or seeking out." 4  It has been established that a
search involves a prying into hidden places which requires more than
the use of the ordinary senses of sight, 5 hearing, 6 or smell. 7 A trespass
to person or property is ordinarily involved." Thus, a policeman peeking
into a transom9 or eavesdropping at a keyhole' is not engaged in a
"search" within the meaning of the fourth amendment, provided he has
not gained his vantage point by force, trespass or fraud.''
The wiretapping cases0 2 have turned on this consideration. Begin-
ning with Olmstead v. United States,"°3 the Supreme Court has consis-
tently held that, so long as there is no technical trespass, neither the use of
tapped telephone lines..4 nor wireless radio amplifiers0 5 constitute a
94. People v. Bonchard, 161 Cal. App. 2d 302, 326 P.2d 646 (1958).
95. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
96. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S.
129 (1942); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). Cf. Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
97. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1947).
98. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
99. Ibid.
100. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949); United States v. Buckner, 164 F. Supp.
836 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
101. McDonald v, United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
102. An extended analysis of the wiretapping cases is beyond the scope of this article. The
Supreme Court decisions in this area referred to in the text are cited only to illustrate the
boundaries of "search" and "seizure." For detailed study of the evolution of the wiretapping
cases, see Bradley & Hogan, Wiretapping: From Nardone to Benanti and Rathbun, 46 GEO.
L.J. 418 (1958); Rosensweig, The Law of Wiretapping, 32 CORNELL L. Q. 514 (1946), 33
CORNELL L. Q. 73 (1947); DASH, SCHWARTZ & KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROPPERS, (1959).
103. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
104. See the opinion of Justice Taft, speaking for the court in Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 464-65 (1928) over the vigorous dissents of Brandeis, Holmes, Butler and
Stone: "The [Fourth] Amendment does not forbid what was done here. There was no
searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing
and that only. There was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants .... The lan-
guage of the [Fourth) Amendment cannot be extended and expanded to include telephone
wires, reaching to the whole world from defendant's house or office. The intervening wires
are not part of his house or office, any more than are the highways along which they are
stretched .... Cf. Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957).
105. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) (agent with concealed microphone on
his person invited onto premises of accused); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942)
(amplifier held next to common wall). But cf. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505
(1961), in which a "spike mike" attached to a common wall actually penetrated defendant's
premises and utilized the heating system as a sound conductor. The Court held this to be an
illegal search, distinguishing On Lee and Goldman on the ground that in those cases there
was no actual physical trespass.
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"search" or "seizure" within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Con-
sequently, evidence so obtained should not be excluded." 6
The validity of the emphasis placed by the Supreme Court upon dis-
tinguishing minutely different fact situations on the basis of the rules
of technical trespass is open to serious question. It is suggested that Mr.
Justice Douglas' loss of patience with such fine distinctions in the recent
case of Silverman v. United States' has both social wisdom' and his-
torical accuracy"' to commend it.
Search with a Warrant
The fourth amendment itself sets out explicitly the requirements of a
warrant:
[N]o Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.110 (Emphasis added.)
106. It should be noted that, although Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) applied
the federal exclusionary rule to the states as to evidence "obtained by searches and seizures in
violation of the Constitution" and expressly overruled Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949),
in this connection, the Court did not specifically say that evidence obtained in violation of afederal statute, (Federal Communications Act § 605, 48 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605
(1958), which prohibits the interception and divulgence of wire or radio communications)
was subject to the exclusionary rule. Nor did it even mention Schwartz v. Texas, 334 U.S.
199 (1952), the wiretapping counterpart of Wolf v. Colorado, supra, which held that evi-
dence procured by wiretapping in violation of federal statute was admissible in a state court.
The writers are of the opinion that Schwartz was not expressly overruled only because the
facts in Mapp v. Ohio did not lend themselves to such action. But the necessary implications
of the extension of the exclusionary rule to the states as to evidence obtained in violation of
the Constitution will soon manifest themselves in all instances of evidence obtained by
official lawlessness - whether in violation of the federal Constitution or federal statutes. The
parallel and analogous development of the wiretapping decisions (which are outside the scope
of the fourth amendment) and the search and seizure cases suggests that Mapp is the death-
blow to Schwartz. But this clarification of the Mapp rule is for the Supreme Court. At least
one lower court has on several occasions since Mapp v. Ohio limited its application to evidence
obtained by constitutional lawlessness. Bolger v. Cleary, 30 U.S.L. Week 2079 (2d Cir.,
Aug. 4, 1961); Williams v. Ball, 30 U.S.L. Week 2109 (2d Cir., Sept. 12, 1961).
107. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
108. Id. at 512-13 (concurring opinion of Douglas, J.) : "My trouble with stare decisis in
this field is that it leads us to a matching of cases on irrelevant facts. An electronic device on
the outside wall of a house is a permissible invasion of privacy, . . . while an electronic
device that penetrates the wall ... is not. Yet the invasion of privacy is as great in one case
as in the other.... Was not the wrong in both cases done when the intimacies of the home
were tapped, recorded or revealed? . . . Our concern should not be with the trivialities of
the local law of trespass.... But neither should the command of the Fourth Amendment be
limited by nice distinctions to turning on the kind of electronic equipment employed. Rather
our sole concern should be with whether the privacy of the home was invaded." (Emphasis
added.)
109. It should be noted that in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), which origi-
.nated the federal exclusionary rule in criminal cases, emphasis is placed upon the nature of
the intrusion rather than the technicality of the trespass. See the following language from
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616-30 (1886), quoted in Tfeeks with approval: "'It is
not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers that constitute the essence of
the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty,
and private property. .. ."' (Emphasis added.) 232 U.S. at 391.
110. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Federal rules and state statutes have implemented the con-
1961]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW[
As a consequence, a warrant will be constitutionally defective unless the
affidavit seeking the warrant contains these essential elements: (1) a
statement of facts showing probable cause that a crime has been com-
mitted, (2) specification of the place to be searched, (3) a description
of the articles sought with reasonable particularity."'
While a search warrant is not invalidated because of minor defects in
it,12 material defects in any of the essential elements will cause the war-
rant to be invalid ab initio, and any search and seizure pursuant thereto
will be illegal unless it can be otherwise justified.
With respect to probable cause,"' it is not necessary that the state-
ments in the affidavit be in a form which would be admissible in evidence
in a jury trial." 4 Statements of suspicion" 5 or on information and be-
lief" without disclosure of supporting facts to justify such suspicion or
belief are insufficient.
The specification of the place to be searched must be sufficiently de-
tailed to make clear the search area in which there is probable cause to
believe a crime has been committed; a general or roving search warrant
is invalid." 7 Thus, a warrant describing an entire building as the place
to be searched is invalid where probable cause has been shown only for
searching one room or apartment."'
Nor does the law enforcement officer have unlimited rummaging
rights once the warrant has been obtained. Even though the issuance of
the warrant may be proper, its wrongful execution may invalidate it.
Since the validity of a warrant is determined at the time it is issued, it can-
stitutional requirements. E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (a-g); CAL. PEN. CODE § 1523-42; ILL.
REV. STAT. ch., §§ 691-99 (1957).
111. United States v. Hinton, 219 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1955).
112. Ledbetter v. United States, 211 F.2d 628 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 977
(1954); Billeci v. United States, 184 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Palmer v. United States,
203 F.2d 66 (D.C. Cir. 1953); United States v. Daniels, 10 F.R.D. 225 (D.N.J. 1950).
113. Probable cause will be considered in greater detail in the discussion of search and
seizure without a warrant. See p. 85 infra. Probable cause as it relates to an arrest of the
person either with or without a warrant will not be separately surveyed in this article although
generally the considerations involved are the same.
114. Giacona v. United States, 257 F.2d 450 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 873 (1958);
Weise v. United States, 251 F.2d 867 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 936 (1958); Jones v.
United States, 271 F.2d 494 (1959). But cf. Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124 (1932).
115. Baysden v. United States, 271 F.2d 325 (1959); United States v. Castle, 138 F. Supp.
436 (D.D.C. 1955).
116. United States v. Office No. 508, 119 F. Supp. 24 (W.D. La. 1954).
117. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961); United States v. Hinton, 219 F.2d
324 (7th Cir. 1955); United States v. Barkouskas, 38 F.2d 837 (D.C. Cir. 1930); United
States v. Brown, 151 F. Supp. 441 (E.D. Va. 1957). See also Justice Butler's strong lan-
guage in Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 195-96 (1927): "General searches have
long been deemed to violate fundamental rights. It is plain that the [Fourth] Amendment
forbids them .... The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the thing to be
seized makes general searches under them impossible."
118. Ibid.
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not be justified on the basis of what is found thereafter.119 Ordinarily,
unless there is an overriding necessity which would validate a search
even without a warrant,O only the place specified in the warrant may be
searched and the article named taken." But it has been held permissible
to seize things other than those described in the search warrant if they
bear a reasonable relation to the purpose of the search. 2 Thus, where
a search warrant described the items to be seized as intoxicating liquors
and articles for their manufacture, the Supreme Court permitted a seizure
of ledgers and bills in a closet on the premises which demonstrated de-
fendants' connection with the liquor business,' although probably this
holding was based upon rights which the officers would have had even
in the absence of a warrant.1  Furthermore, it has been held that an
article which is properly subject to search and seizure and which comes into
the possession of an arresting officer in the course of a lawful search
need not be returned merely because the arresting officer was not particu-
larly looking for it. "  And, of course, weapons may be seized even
though not described in the warrant on the theory that such seizure is
necessary to safeguard the arrest or the officer.'
But, even an officer in possession of a valid warrant may not break
into a private dwelling without stating in advance and in loud tones his
purpose." A knock on the door is not enough."2 But if he identifies
119. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
120. See discussion p. 80 infra.
121. United States v. One Buick 1949 Sedanette, 112 F. Supp. 218 (D. Mass. 1953). See
Justice Butler's unequivocal statement in Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 195-96
(1927) : 'The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the thing to be seized...
prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be
taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant." These are strong
and clear words. But cf. result in Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
122. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); United States v. Joseph, 174 F. Supp.
539 (E.D. Pa. 1959). But cf. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), in which
police entered with arrest warrant charging accused with mail fraud and transportation of
forged checks. The search turned up forged draft cards, although the police were only look-
ing for stolen checks. The search was held to be valid.
123. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
124. Id. at 195. The court found that the accused was committing a felony (selling liquor)
in the presence of the arresting officers. This is a favorite technique of courts that wish to
justify a search where the yield is far different from what was contemplated by the police upon
entry. E.g., Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
125. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145
(1947).
126. Palmer v. United States, 203 F.2d 66 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
127. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958). The officers said "police" softly and
failed to announce their intention to arrest the accused before breaking in. It was held that
the entry was illegal even though accused tried to slam the door in the policemen's faces. See
Gatewood v. United States, 209 F.2d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1953). Police said they were from '"West-
ern Union" and were admitted by subterfuge. The entry was held to be illegal. See also Mc-
Knight v. United States, 183 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cit. 1950); Accarino v. United States, 179 F.2d
456 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
128. Curtis v. United States, 354 U.S. 926 (1957); Woods v. United States, 240 F.2d 37
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 941 (1957).
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himself as a law enforcement officer, knocks and receives no response,
he may break in without invalidating the warrant or the search.' The
same rules apply to an arrest without a warrant."' However, these rules
do not apply under emergency circumstances, such as occur when the ac-
cused is fleeing or otherwise attempting to avoid arrest or destroy evi-
dence' . or when officers are justified in believing that they or someone
else is in physical peril."2
Search Without a Warrant
It cannot be over-emphasized that the fourth amendment has been
interpreted to mean that the government may not, except upon urgent
necessity, invade the privacy of its citizens without a warrant."3
As the cases have developed, certain exceptions to the rule (that
searches shall be by warrant) have emerged. Thus, a search without a
warrant may not violate the fourth amendment if: (1) it is made with
the consent of one who is qualified to give consent, or (2) it is incidental
to a lawful arrest, or (3) there is probable cause to believe that a felony
has been committed, or (4) it is necessary to safeguard a law enforce-
ment officer or his arrest, or to protect evidence likely to be destroyed.
These exceptions derive, in some instances, from the just require-
ments of law enforcement but in others, regrettably, from a misreading
of the fourth amendment in the context of its historical origin and its
contemporary significance.
Consent
There can be no doubt that where a person freely gives his consent
to a search, such consent will validate the search without a warrant."'
129. United States v. Purgitt, 176 F. Supp. 557 (D.D.C. 1959); United States v. Price, 149 F.
Supp. 707 (D.D.C. 1957).
130. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
131. People v. Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d 301, 294 P.2d 6 (1956).
132. Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166 (1822).
133. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948), for a general statement of
the rule and its rationale: "[The fourth amendment] guarantee of protection against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures .... with few exceptions, stays the hands of the police unless they have
a search warrant issued by a magistrate on probable cause supported by oath or affirmation....
We are not dealing with formalities. The presence of a search warrant serves a high function.
Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between
the citizen and the police. This was done not to shield criminals nor to make the home a
safe haven for illegal activities. It was done so that an objective mind might weigh the need
to invade that privacy in order to enforce the law. The right of privacy was deemed too
precious to entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest
of criminals. Power is a heady thing; and history shows that the police acting on their own
cannot be trusted. And so the constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the desires of the
police before they violate the privacy of the home. We cannot be true to that constitutional
requirement and excuse the absence of a search warrant without a showing by those who seek
exemption from the constitutional mandate that the exigencies of the situation made that
course imperative." (Emphasis added.)
134. United States v. Sferas, 210 F.2d 69 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 935 (1954).
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The justification is that consent operates as a waiver of constitutional ob-
jections."' But mere submission to authority is not consent."' Nor may
a person under the compulsion of a subpoena be deemed to have given
his free consent to a search without a warrant." 7 And consent will not
be inferred where there has been an arrest or other official pressure.'
Who may give consent to a search? It has been held that the con-
sent of any third party legitimately in charge of the searched premises is
sufficient to validate a warrantless search. 9 Thus, the consent of the
hotel manager to a search of a room recently vacated by the suspect was
sufficient. 4 ' Consent to search given by the wife of the accused 4. or a
building superintendent 2 has been upheld. And it has been suggested
that one who rents a room in a rooming house cannot complain if the
police enter the general premises with the consent of the landlady, an-
other tenant, or the guest of such tenant.'43 But a boarder cannot give
consent to search premises of an accused in his absence.'44 A right to
possession of the premises to be searched is apparently the common ele-
ment necessary before one may waive a fourth amendment violation of
premises searched following consent.
Search Incident to Lawful Arrest
While the Supreme Court has held upon a number of occasions that
a warrantless general search of the premises of an accused contempo-
raneous with and incident to a lawful arrest on such premises, does not
135. People v. Soretsky, 343 111. 583, 175 NE. 844 (1931).
136. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1947); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313
(1921).
137. Nelson v. United States, 208 F.2d 505 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 827 (1953);
In re Wallace & Tierman Co., 76 F. Supp. 215 (D.R.I. 1948).
138. Waldron v. United States, 219 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1955); United States v. Broadway
Arrington, 215 F.2d 630 (7th Cir. 1954); Higgins v. United States, 209 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir.
1954); Catalonotte v. United States, 208 F.2d 264 (6th Cir. 1953); Judd v. United States,
190 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1951). But cf. Brainard v. United States, 220 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir.
1955).
139. United States v. Sferas, 210 F.2d 69 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 935 (1954);
United States v. Walker, 190 F.2d 481 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 342 U.S. 868 (1951); Gillars v.
United States, 182 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Stein v. United States,-166 F.2d 851 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 334 U.S. 844 (1948). Cf. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960).
140. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960).
141. United States v. Walker, 190 F.2d 481 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 868 (1951)
(reputed wife); Stein v. United States, 166 F.2d 851 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 844
(1948) (common law wife). Cf. Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921).
142. Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1950); cf. McDonald v. United States,
335 U.S. 451, 458 (1948) (concurring opinion).
143. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 458 (1948) (concurring opinion of Jack-
son, J.). Presumably illegal entry into the room itself would require the consent of the
tenant, but peeking into his transom or listening at his keyhole, since neither is technically a
"search" or "seizure," would not require his consent. See discussion p. 76 supra.
144. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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violate the fourth amendment,'45 the scope of the rule is very much in
doubt. 46 The Supreme Court cases in this area "cannot be satisfactorily
reconciled,"' 1 and the wisdom of the rule has been subject to powerful,
not to say overpowering, attack.'48
Clearly an exception to the general requirement that the government
shall not invade the privacy of the home, unless authorized to do so by
a search warrant, the rule which permits a warrantless search of the ac-
cused's premises where the search is incident to a lawful arrest on the
premises is not at this late date in dispute in its narrowest application. It
is well settled that, upon lawful arrest, the person of the accused may
be searched and articles in his immediate physical control may be
145. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56
(1950); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S.
192 (1927); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
146. See Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948). But see United States v. Rabino-
witz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). However, McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948),
United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948), Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1947),
and Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932), closely related in principle to Trupiano, still
stand. See also Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961) in which Taylor and John-
son were expressly relied upon by the Supreme Court although "underlying the decision [was]
the approach of Trupiano." 365 U.S. at 618-19 (concurring opinion of Frankfurter, J.)
147. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 235 (1960).
148. See the strong language of Justice Frankfurter in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339
U.S. 56, 70-80 (1950) (dissenting opinion): ". . . I suggest that it makes a mockery of
the Fourth Amendment to sanction search without a search warrant merely because of the
legality of an arrest. I have yet to hear the answer to Judge Learned Hand's reasoning below
that to make the validity of a search depend upon the presence of the party in the premises
searched at the time of the arrest .. would make crucial a circumstance that has no rational
relevance to the purpose of the privilege. The feelings which lie behind it have their basis in
the resentment, inevitable in a free society, against the invasion of a man's privacy without
some judicial sanction. It is true that where one has been arrested ... his privacy has already
been invaded; but that interest, though lost, is altogether separate from the interest in pro-
tecting his papers from indiscriminate rummage ... The short of it is that the right to search
the place of arrest is an innovation based on confusion, without historic foundation, and made
in the teeth of a historic protection against it .... To tear 'unreasonable' from the context
and history and purpose of the Fourth Amendment in applying the narrow exception of search
as an incident to an arrest is to disregard the reason to which reference must be made
when a question arises under the Fourth Amendment. It is to make the arrest an inaident to
an unwarranted search instead of a warrantless search an incident to an arrest. ... The main
aim of the Fourth Amendment is against invasion of the right of privacy as to one's effects
and papers without regard to the result of such invasion.... The justification for intrusion
into a man's privacy was to be determined by a magistrate uninfluenced by what may turn out
to be a successful search .... The framers did not regard judicial authorization as a formal
requirement for a piece of paper. They deemed a man's belongings part of his personality and
his life .... ." (Emphasis added.)
See also the cogent remarks of Judge Learned Hand in United States v, Kirschenblatt, 16
F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 1926): "After arresting a man in his house, to rummage at will
among his papers in search of whatever will convict him, appears to us to be indistinguishable
from what might be done under a general warrant; indeed, the warrant would give more
protection, for presumably it must be issued by a magistrate. True, by hypothesis the power
would not exist, if the supposed offender were not found on the premises; but it is small con-
solation to know that one's papers are safe only so long as one is not at home." (Emphasis
added.)
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seized. 49 Arresting officers may seize plainly visible instruments or fruits
of crime at the scene of the arrest. 5. But where the scope of the search
incident to arrest goes beyond the physical person of the accused and the
items in his immediate control, there is no such unanimity of opinion.
The Supreme Court has allowed a contemporaneous search of a closet in
a saloon in which an arrest took place,'51 the bathroom adjoining a hotel
room in which an arrest was made, 52 and an entire four-room apartment,
in the living room of which the accused was arrested.' 3 But search of a
home several blocks away from the place where the arrest was made was
held too remote.'
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has also held that a warrant-
less search of a single room in which the accused was arrested was too
broad in scope, 55 and that the removal of all of the contents of a cabin
to an FBI office 200 miles away for examination was beyond the scope
of permissible search. 5 '
It should be noted that the search must actually accompany and be
incident to a lawful arrest.57 Thus a search by an officer who was not of
the group which eventually made the arrest,'58 a search of a garage prior
to a future arrest on the premises,5 9 and police entry for the admitted pur-
pose of searching, rather than arresting, although an arrest on the prem-
ises actually took place about an hour later,"0 all failed to fall within the
coverage of the "search incident to arrest" exception, and were, hence,
149. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); Agnello v. United States,
269 U.S. 20 (1925); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925); Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
150. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931). Compare Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948) with
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). See also Marron v. United States, 275 U.S.
192 (1927).
151. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927). This case was limited to its facts by
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931) and United States v. Lefkowitz,
285 U.S. 452 (1932). The Court pointed out in the two later cases that in Marron a crime
was being openly committed in the presence of the police officers and the articles seized were
in plain view of the officers. The Court concluded that the broad rule in Marron was un-
necessary to the result and limited the case accordingly.
152. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
153. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
154. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 1925).
155. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931) (police used force to
compel accused to open safe and unlock desk); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452
(1932) (no force used as desks and cabinet were not locked). Contra, United States v. Ra-
binowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
156. Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957).
157. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958); Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74
(1949).
158. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
159. Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932).
160. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958).
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illegal searches. It will be observed that the Supreme Court and the
federal courts have placed great stress upon the requirement that the
arrest precede the search. 6' This emphasis is probably based upon the
oft-stated principle that an illegal search is never justified by its success," 2
and the rejection of the "boot-strap" argument that a search is justified
by an arrest which, in turn, is based upon the fruit of the search.'
Under the rule which permits a warrantless search incident to a
lawful arrest, the arrest may be lawful either when there is a valid arrest
warrant,' when probable cause exists to believe that a felony has been
committed by the accused,'65 or when a felony is committed in the presence
of arresting officers who gained access to the premises by lawful means.'66
While it is not the intention of the writers to deal exhaustively here
with the law of arrest, 6 ' it may be noted in passing that either a criminal
warrant obtained from a magistrate... or an administrative warrant 69
will be sufficient, if properly drawn and obtained, to validate an arrest.
The warrantless search incident to arrest is an ever-widening excep-
tion to the command of the fourth amendment that searches shall be
by authority of judicial warrant. It is a constantly growing aperture in
161. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1
(1932). See Raniele v. United States, 34 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1929); United States v. Waller,
108 F. Supp 450 (N.D. Ill. 1952). But some states hold otherwise. E.g., People v. Duronce-
lay, 48 Cal. 2d 776, 312 P.2d 690 (1957).
162. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S.
581 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1947); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S.
28 (1927).
163. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948). See also Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10, 16-17 (1947): "Thus the Government is obliged to justify the arrest by the
search and at the same time to justify the search by the arrest. This will not do. An officer
gaining access to private living quarters .... must then have some valid basis in law for the
intrusion. Any other rule would undermine 'the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects', and would obliterate one of the most fundamental dis-
tinctions between our form of government, where officers are under the law and the police-
state where they are the law."
164. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56
(1950); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
165. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925). It will be noted that in the Carroll case, the Court spoke of "probable cause in
justifying seizures" and "probable cause... in making arrests without warrant" and probable
cause in malicious prosecution and false arrest cases synonymously. Note also that the probable
cause necessary to obtain a warrant is indistinguishable in definition from probable cause which
will justify an arrest or search without a warrant. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
The writers in discussing probable cause throughout this article will deal with these concepts
similarly.
166. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192
(1927).
167. For a consideration of the law of arrest in detail, see Police Detention and Arrest Privi-
leges: An International Symposium, 51 J. CRIM. L. 385 (1960); Coakley, Restrictions in the
Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U. L. REV. 2 (1957).
168. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S.
192 (1927).
169. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
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the wall of privacy which the fourth amendment has erected between the
private citizen and his government.
Many resourceful law enforcement officers find it totally unnecessary
ever to use a search warrant as long as the exception of warrantless
search incident to arrest is available to them. Why should they apply for
a warrant in which they must describe the place to be searched and the
articles to be seized with particularity when they can arrest the suspect
in his home, conduct a general and roving search which a magistrate
would never permit them by warrant and perhaps turn up some in-
criminating evidence which would justify the arrest ab initio? How
much simpler from the law enforcement standpoint "to justify the arrest
by the search and at the same time to justify the search by the arrest."''
But such an approach, while efficient from the law officer's viewpoint,
cannot be constitutionally justified on such grounds.' Cutting "red
tape" has never been the test of the constitutionality of police behavior,
and Justice Frankfurter's warning in this regard explains why it is par-
ticularly to be discouraged in application here:
Arrest under a warrant for a minor or trumped up charge has been
familiar practice in the past, is [a] commonplace in the police state
of today, and too well known in this country. 172
Under such circumstances the search warrant becomes an obsolete
piece of paper, the right of privacy becomes subject to the whim of the
policeman, and our free society takes a long step toward its own annihila-
tion.
Probable Cause
The probable cause which is necessary to validate an arrest and/or
search without a warrant has been described as "a belief, reasonably
arising out of circumstances known to the ... officer" that a crime has
been committed' T or, more simply stated, "a reasonable ground for be-
lief of guilt."'74  "If the facts and circumstances before the officer are
such as to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that the
offense has been committed, it is sufficient."'7" But simple belief 7 '
170. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 16-17 (1947).
171. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454-55 (1948), in which Justice Doug-
las speaking for the court, said: "[TIhere must be compelling reasons to justify the absence
of a search warrant. ... No reason, except inconvenience of the officers and delay in preparing
papers and getting before a magistrate, appears for the failure to seek a search warrant. But
those reasons are no justification for by-passing the constitutional requirement. ..."
172. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 82 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
173. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
174. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
175. Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878).
176. Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933).
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and good faith of the arresting officer 7' are not enough. "That faith
must be grounded on facts within [hisi knowledge . . . which in the
judgment of the court would make his faith reasonable."' 78  Probable
cause need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt 79 but it must be
something more than mere suspicion,180 common rumor, or even "strong
reason to suspect."'
18
There has been considerable litigation over whether, as distinguished
from the personal observations of the officer, hearsay evidence of an in-
former is sufficient to constitute probable cause.'82 Standing alone it is
probably not enough."s But if "the informant's statement is reasonably
corroborated by other matters within the officer's knowledge" such hear-
say may be the basis of probable cause, either in obtaining a warrant"8
or to support an arrest and search without a warrant. 8 ' Thus, the "re-
liable" nature of the informant, coupled with a police finding that the
informant's tip describing the accused and his whereabouts checked out
exactly, constitutes probable cause to support an arrest.' Such a result
has, however, been vigorously attacked. 87
But it is dear that where the identity of the informant is concealed
from the court, such informant's hearsay "tip" is insufficient to constitute
probable cause.'88
The question whether probable cause is a sufficient constitutional
substitute for a search warrant has been considered by the Supreme Court,
177. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
178. Director General v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25 (1923).
179. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307
(1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
180. Ibid. See also Shurman v. United States, 219 F.2d 282 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 349
U.S. 921 (1955); Rent v. United States, 209 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1954); United States v.
Plymouth Coupe, 182 F.2d 180 (3rd Cir. 1950).
181. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
182. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307
(1959); Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938); Worthington v. United States, 166
F.2d 557 (6th Cir. 1948); United States v. Bianco, 94 F. Supp. 239 (W.D. Pa. 1950), rev'd.
on other grounds, 189 F.2d 716 (3rd Cir. 1951); United States v. Nichols, 78 F. Supp. 483
(W.D. Ark. 1948), afj'd, 176 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1949).
183. Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938); Worthington v. United States, 166 F.2d
557 (6th Cir. 1948); United States v. Bianco, 94 F. Supp. 239 (W.D. Pa. 1950), resd on
other grounds, 189 F.2d 716 (3d Cir. 1951).
184. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
185. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
186. Ibid.
187. See statement of Justice Douglas in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 273 (1960)
(concurring opinion) : '"This is an age where faceless informers have been reintroduced into
our society in alarming ways . . . Unless the magistrate makes his independent judgment on
all the known facts, then he tends to become merely the tool of police interests." (Emphasis
added.) See also Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959) (dissenting opinion of
Douglas, J.).
188. Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938). But cf. United States v. Nichols, 78 F.
Supp. 483 (W.D. Ark 1948), aff'd., 176 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1949).
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with varying results.'89 In cases involving search of open fields,' mov-
ing vehicles,'91 and business offices.. the courts have held that probable
cause to believe that a crime has been committed is enough. But this
rule has been specifically rejected in its application to private dwellings .9 .
where it has been held that a search warrant is required.
Note that probable cause is an indispensable element to justify a
search in both instances, 94 but where invasion of a private dwelling is
contemplated, the initial determination of whether probable cause to
search exists is left to a magistrate rather than to the policeman. This is
a distinction with a constitutional difference.'95
With respect to all stationary buildings, the Supreme Court formu-
lated a rule in Trupiano v. United Statesw '96 that whether or not there was
a valid arrest, an incidental search and seizure will be constitutionally
invalid if there was time and opportunity to procure a search warrant but
189. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925). But cf. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961); Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10 (1947); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
190. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924); Edwards v. United States, 206 F.2d 855
(10th Cir. 1953).
191. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 261 U.S.
132 (1925).
192. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). But cf. United States v. Lefkowitz,
285 U.S. 452 (1932); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
193. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948) (room in rooming house); Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) (hotel room); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383(1914) (private dwelling). Cf. Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932) (garage adjoin-
ing private dwelling). See also Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925) quoted
with approval in Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 613 (1961): "Belief, however well
founded, that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling house furnishes no justification for
a search of that place without a warrant. Aud such searches are held unlawful notwithstand-
ing facts unquestionably showing probable cause." (Emphasis added.) In Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949), the Court carefully distinguished its facts from those in-
volving private dwellings: "No problem of searching the home or any other place of privacy
was presented either in Carroll or here. Both cases involve freedom to use public highways in
swiftly moving vehicles .. "
194. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 104 (1959).
195. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) in which Mr. Justice Jackson,
speaking for the Court, said: "The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not
grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual
inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the
officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any assumption
that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a search
warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amend-
ment to a nullity and leave the people's homes secure only in the discretion of police officers."
See also Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 710 (1948), in which Mr. Justice Murphy,
speaking for the Court, said: "It is a mistake to assume that a search warrant... would con-
tribute nothing to the preservation of the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment. A
search warrant must describe with particularity the place to be searched and the things to be
seized. Without such a warrant, however, officers are free to determine for themselves the
extent of their search and the precise objects to be seized. This is no small difference. It is
a difference upon which depends much of the potency of the right of privacy .....
196. 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
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the police failed to do so. Scarcely two years later this rule was aban-
doned in United States v. Rabinowitz.'97 The Court substituted the test
of "reasonableness" of the search for the practicability of procuring a
search warrant'98 over the biting dissent of Justice Frankfurter. 9
It is apparent that the Supreme Court has in the past2. regarded the
approach later taken in Rabinowitz as a backward step in constitutional
history and the development of human freedom and there are clear indi-
cations that it seems to think so at the present time."0' An examination of
the opinions in McDonald v. United States,2"2 Johnson v. United States,03
and Taylor v. United States2" demonstrates clearly that these cases turned
upon the availability of, and opportunity to procure, a search warrant.
They are still good law today. The very recent case of Chapman v.
United States.°5 is clear evidence of the present Court's intention to
revert to the spirit of the Trupiano rule, if not to its exact letter. It is
suggested that a rule which at its origin was based neither upon logic
nor experience but which resulted from changes of personnel on a bitter-
ly divided court and which has seen the very court which established it
turn its back upon it has been drained of whatever vitality it may have
possessed at its inception and is now awaiting the oblivion of explicit re-
jection. At very least, Rabinowitz must be confined to its facts.20"
Search Necessary to Safeguard Arrest
Another exception to the constitutional command that a search must
be by warrant is that an officer may search the person of the accused and
the premises within his reach for weapons, both to safeguard the arrest
197. 339 U.S. 56 (1950). This dramatic reversal of position is traceable directly to the per-
sonnel changes on the court rather than to a considered rejection of the rule. Justices Murphy
and Rutledge of the Trupiano court, staunch friends of the fourth amendment, had been re-
placed on the Rabinowitz Court by Justices Minton and Burton. See Justice Black's dry obser-
vation in Rabinowitz: "In my judgment it would be wiser judicial policy to adhere to the
Trupiano rule . . .at least long enough to see how it works." 339 U.S. at 67 (dissenting
opinion).
198. Id. at 65.
199. Id. at 83, 84: "There must be a warrant to permit search, barring only inherent limita-
tions upon that requirement when there is a good excuse for not getting a search warrant...
It is for this Court to lay down criteria that the district judges can apply. It is no criterion of
reason to say that the district court must find it reasonable.... [Tihe presence or absence of an
ample opportunity for getting a search warrant [is) very important. It is not a rule of thumb.
It is a rule of the Fourth Amendment...."
200. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S.
10 (1947); Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932).
201. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
202. 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
203. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
204. 286 U.S. 1 (1932).
205. 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
206. Faint hearts convinced that an unjust rule must be perpetuated because it is well-
entrenched are referred to Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) for proof that sometimes
justice triumphs even at the expense of stare decisis.
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and the life of the arresting officer."' There is no dispute about this
exception because it is based upon clear necessity. Nor would there be
argument if the principle were extended to include search for tools or
implements, such as skeleton keys or hacksaw blades, by which the
prisoner might effect an escape, or drugs or poison, by which the prisoner
might injure himself.
Furthermore, it is clear that where relevant evidence is likely to be
concealed or destroyed unless the officer acts with speed, a search or
seizure without a warrant is justified, again on grounds of emergency
and necessity.20 8 But these exceptions should apply only if the officer is
rightly on the premises. He should have no right to protect an arrest
which is invalid or to preserve evidence for which he is not entitled to
search.
Administrative Search and Seizure
Until this point, consideration has been given to search and seizure
as it relates to criminal process, judicial warrants, and the police. In
recent years, fourth amendment problems relating to administrative war-
rants, civil administrative search procedure, and administrative officials
have received increasing attention from the courts. 9 The importance
of these problems cannot be overestimated. As the executive branch of
government has expanded, as administrative functions have increased
and governmental regulation of private affairs for the general welfare
has become entrenched, these effects have been felt in the area of indi-
vidual privacy; one may anticipate that they will be in evidence even
more frequently in the future.
While it has been held that an administrative warrant is equivalent
and subject to the same rules of search and seizure as a judicial war-
rant,"' recently the Supreme Court, in Frank v. Maryland,"' has ex-
panded the area of permissible administrative search without a warrant
207. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) (rule applies to administrative as well as
criminal arrests); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); Agnello v. United States,
269 U.S. 20 (1925).
208. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
209. Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217
(1960); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959); District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d
13, aff'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
210. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960). But see the vigorous dissent of Justice
Douglas in which Justice Black joined: "[A]dministradve officers - as distinguished from
police ... need not go to magistrates, the Court says, for warrants of arrest. Their warrants
are issued within the hierarchy of the agency itself. Yet... the Fourth Amendment in origin
had to do as much with ferreting out heretics and collecting taxes as with enforcement of the
criminal laws.... Moreover the administrative officer who invades the privacy of the home
may be only a front for the police who are thus saved the nuisance of getting a warrant...
The administrative official with an administrative warrant, over which no judicial official
exercises any supervision... performs a new role. The police wear his mask to do police
work. That, in my view, may not be done." 362 U.S. at 242.
211. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
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beyond its police counterpart.212 In Frank, by a five to four decision,
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a Baltimore ordinance
which provided criminal penalties for a homeowner who refused to per-
mit a health inspector to enter his home during the daylight hours when-
ever he had cause to suspect the existence of a nuisance. Justice Frank-
furter, writing for the Court, sustained the ordinance on the ground that
the necessities of health inspection override the peripheral infringement
of the right of privacy, by the application of his famous test of "balanc-
ing"21 the needs of the public. That the four dissenting Justices214 were
unconvinced of the soundness of the majority opinion is evident from the
stinging language of Justice Douglas's dissent215 and the positions taken
by the same Justices in the standoff four to four decision 20 in Ohio ex rel.
Eaton v. Price.
217
In Price, the four Justices in favor of affirming a conviction under a
218
similar Dayton ordinance, went even further than the majority did in
Frank. In Frank, the health inspector at least had reasonable grounds
to believe that there was a health nuisance on the premises because he
had observed filth and rat excrement in the backyard. While a warrant
on such a showing would have been easy to procure from a magistrate
and should have been required by the ordinance in order to satisfy the
fourth amendment,219 in Price, there was even less justification for up-
holding the search. In the latter case although there was no evidence of
212. Even giving the broadest scope to the exceptions to the exclusionary rule, a police of-
ficer must have probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed before he may
enter a home to search without a warrant. But since health inspectors and other administra-
tive officers rarely are searching for evidence of crimes when they enter a home, to permit
them to search without a warrant sets a decidedly lower standard of fourth amendent protec-
tions for them than for policemen; in fact, it reduces such protections "to the vanishing point."
See the opinion of Justice Brennan in Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 268 (1960).
213. "[TIhere are no constitutional rights that cannot be 'balanced' away." Wilkinson v.
United States, 365 U.S. 399, 423 (1961) (dissenting opinion of Black, J.).
214. The justices were Warren, Black, Douglas, and Brennan.
215. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 374 (1959) (dissenting opinion): 'Trhe question in
this case is whether a search warrant is needed to investigate sanitary conditions....
"[The fourth amendment] was designed to protect the citizen against uncontrolled in-
vasion of his privacy. It does not make his home a place of refuge from the law. It only
requires the sanction of the judiciary rather than the executive before that privacy may be
invaded. History shows that all officers tend to be officious; and health inspectors, making
out a case for criminal prosecution of the citizen, are no exception .....
"Health inspections are important. But they are hardly more important than the search
for narcotic peddlers, rapists, kidnappers, murderers and other criminal elements. . . . It
would seem that the public interest in protecting privacy is equally as great in one case as in
another."
216. Justice Stewart, with the majority in Frank, did not participate.
217. 364 U.S. 263, 269 (1960). Justice Brennan, speaking for Chief Justice Warren and
Justices Black and Douglas said: "[M]uch reliance at the bar has been put on Frank v. Mary-
land.... We would not be candid to say that on its own facts we have become reconciled
to that judgment."
218. They were Justices Frankfurter, Clark, Harlan and Whittaker.
219. This was in the opinion of the four dissenters.
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any health violation at all on the part of the homeowner,220 he was con-
victed for failure to permit entry of the health inspector. The relaxation
of the standards of the fourth amendment in the administrative area as
opposed to the comparative progress in criminal law enforcement is
totally unwarranted.22' The decision in Frank v. Maryland thus remains
"the dubious pronouncement of a gravely divided court.
' 2
Conduct of the Law Enforcement Officer
Even though the search and seizure might otherwise be proper, either
pursuant to a warrant or otherwise, where the methods used by the law
enforcement officers amount to "conduct that shocks the conscience,"22 a
conviction based upon evidence so obtained will be reversed. 2 4
This result is derived from the interrelationship between the protec-
tion against illegal search and seizure provided by the fourth amend-
ment225 and the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the
fifth amendment. m" Thus, where police burst into the defendant's bed-
220. Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 271 (1960): "For all that appears here,
the ... [inspector's] action could have been based on caprice or on personal or political spite."
221. No valid answer has yet been provided to Judge Prettyman's statement in District of
Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 17 (1949), af'd., on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950): "To
say that a man suspected of crime has a right to protection against search of his home without
a warrant, but that a man not suspected of crime has no such protection, is a fantastic ab-
surdity."
222. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 24 (1958).
223. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, (1952). It is not clear whether the applica-
tion of the federal exclusionary rule to the states by Mapp v. Ohio will eliminate the need
for the approach in Rochin. Manifestly since fruits of an illegal search or seizure will be
inadmissible in any court as a result of Mapp, this broad rule may encompass the fact situations
contemplated by Rochin, since all that need be shown under Mapp is that the search was
unreasonable, not necessarily "shocking to the conscience." But where entry is lawful, par-
ticularly by warrant, the Rochin doctrine may yet be a valuable adjunct in preventing police
excesses. And, until Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952), is overruled, the principles
of Rochin may be applied in the wiretapping cases through the due process clause, even though
wiretapping is not a "search" or "seizure" within the protection of the fourth amendment. See
note 106 supra.
224. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); United States v. Willis, 85 F. Supp. 745
(S.D. Cal. 1949). But cf. Irvine v. Irvine, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954).
Many shocking instances of police lawlessness and brutality have emanated from California.
E.g., Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954). It is apparent that California felt compelled
to adopt the federal exclusionary rule in People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905
(1955), because the private remedies of criminal prosecution and civil actions for trespass
against errant police officers, so heavily relied upon as alternatives in Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25 (1949), were no deterrent at all to such conduct. See People v. Cahan, supra at
437-38, 282 P.2d 905, 907 (1955): "Without fear of criminal punishment or other dis-
cipline, law enforcement officers, sworn to support the Constitution of the United States and
the Constitution of California, frankly admit their deliberate, flagrant acts in violation of
both Constitutions and the laws enacted thereunder. It is dearly apparent from their testimony
that they casually regard such acts as nothing more than the performance of their ordinary
duties. ... '
225. United States v. Willis, 85 F. Supp. 745 (S.D. Cal. 1949).
226. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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room, saw him swallow several morphine capsules, struggled unsuccess-
fully to open his mouth and extract them, then recovered the pellets by
pumping his stomach against his will and with the use of force, the
Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, reversed the
conviction based upon such evidence, holding that such conduct "is bound
to offend even hardened sensibilities."22 Such methods, he continued, are
"too close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional differen-
tiation." '228 And the conviction was reversed even though the evidence
taken from the defendant's stomach was completely trustworthy and re-
liable.22
While stomach-pumping has been frowned upon as a method of
obtaining evidence,. ° the search of the rectum for narcotics cached there
has been judicially approved.2"' It is difficult to reconcile the results ex-
cept to observe that "Rochin was at one end of the alimentary canal and
Blackford was at the other .... 2 In both instances, force was em-
ployed and pain was inflicted233 to extract evidence from a body cavity;
in both instances the integrity of the body was violated and the privacy
of the person disturbed, and in each case the defendant resisted physically
until he was overpowered.
In Breithaupt v. Abram"4 the Supreme Court sapped the vigor of
the Rochin doctrine by holding that a blood sample drawn by police
from an unconscious man lying in a public highway to determine its
alcohol content in order to convict him of involuntary manslaughter was
not unconscionable conduct which would require reversal of the convic-
tion. The opinion turned upon the fact that the blood sample was
"taken by a skilled technician" 5 and that the "procedure has become
227. Id. at 172.
228. Ibid.
229. While it has been urged as a rationale for excluding coerced confessions that the evi-
dence thus obtained is unreliable, "it would take a rash man indeed to try to disassociate
himself from the contents of his stomach." Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later:
Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal Courts, 43 MINN. L. Rnv. 1083, 1120 (1959).
The basis then, of such exclusion is the brutality of the method used rather than the unreli-
ability of the testimony so secured.
230. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); United States v. Willis, 85 F. Supp. 745
(S.D. Cal. 1949).
231. Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 754 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 914
(1958); Application of Woods, 154 F. Supp. 932 (N.D. Cal. 1957), application denied, 249
F.2d 614 (9th Cit. 1957).
232. Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d at 754, cert. denied, 356 U.S. 914 (1958) (dis-
senting opinion).
233. The Court in the Blackford case attempted to explain away the pain involved in the
rectal probe on the ground that it was "self-inflicted" because defendant failed to cooperate
with the police in the search of his anal cavity. The argument is not at all persuasive. If the
use of force by law enforcement officers may be justified by the failure of the criminal to
"cooperate," our defenses against police brutality have been very much diluted.
234. 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
235. Id. at 437.
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routine in our everyday life."" 6 Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black
and Douglas dissented vigorously23'
But it is clear that where an accused consents to the violation of his
body, no constitutional question is presented s
The scattered decisions in this area suggest that the courts will not
admit evidence obtained by methods which are personally repulsive to
the jurists. They do not provide a more objective yardstick.
It is of perhaps more than passing interest to observe, however, that
since Rochin the Supreme Court has not found a single fact situation
which merited similar judicial treatment. Whether or not this is an indi-
cation of the absorption of the Rochin doctrine into the broad exclusion-
ary rule of Mapp v. Ohio will depend upon whether the Court includes
in its definition of an "unreasonable" search all instances of shocking
methods and whether the Rochin doctrine will be applied to wire-
tapping 3
9
WHO MAY PROTEST A FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION?
In order to move to suppress the fruits of an illegal search and sei-
zure, an accused must have "standing" to object 40 This is based upon
the undisputed rule that only the one whose privacy has been invaded
may protest 4 ' To establish such "standing," the accused must claim
either ownership or possession of the seized property or a substantial pos-
sessory interest in the premises searched.242
Until Jones v. United States,43 it had been held by the inferior fed-
eral courts that one who claimed no interest in the property which was
seized could not move to suppress such evidence on the ground that it was
obtained unconstitutionally 44 Thus, the accused was placed squarely
236. Id. at 436.
237. "[I]f the decencies of a civilized state are the test, it is repulsive to me for the police
to insert needles into an unconscious person in order to get the evidence necessary to convict
him, whether they find the person unconscious, give him a pill which puts him to sleep, or
use force to subdue him. The indignity to the individual is the same in one case as in the
other." 352 U.S. at 444 (dissenting opinion of Douglas, J.) Cf. United States v. Townsend,
151 F. Supp. 378 (D.D.C. 1957), in which the Court refused to permit into evidence chemi-
cal tests for blood stains performed on the penis of the accused over vigorous protest and phys-
ical resistance.
238. In re Guzzardi, 84 F. Supp. 294 (N.D. Tex. 1949) (evidence secured by stomach
pump is admissible where defendant consents).
239. See note 223 supra.
240. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253
(1960).
241. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
242. Ibid.
243. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
244. United States v. Pepe, 247 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1957); Lovette v. United States, 230
F-.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1956); United States v. Eversole, 209 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1954); Steeber
v. United States, 198 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1952); United States v. Reckis, 119 F. Supp. (D.
Mass. 1954).
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between the horns of a procedural dilemma. If, at the preliminary mo-
tion to suppress, he claimed an interest in the seized property, such allega-
tions might well be used against him in a trial on a charge of possession
of such illicit material; if he failed to claim an interest in the property,
he had no standing to suppress the evidence.
But in Jones, the dilemma was resolved. The Supreme Court held
that where possession of the seized evidence both convicts and shows
"standing" to object to the seizure, there is no necessity to show an inter-
est in the premises searched or the property seized.245
However, in a prosecution which does not turn on illicit possession,
the ordinary rules regarding a showing of interest will be applied; such
rules are consequently considered here.
While the cases which had dealt with the type of interest in the
searched premises necessary to raise an objection prior to Jones distin-
guished such interests on the basis of technical real property concepts,246
that landmark decision has obliterated such technical distinctions, even
where the prosecution is not based upon illicit possession."47  The broad
rule of Jones, then, is that "anyone legitimately on premises where a
search occurs may challenge its legality . . . when its fruits are proposed
to be used against him."'248 Property of an accused illegally seized in a
search of the premises of another may be suppressed even though the
accused was not on the premises at the time of the search.249
The rule that an accused may not object to the introduction in evi-
dence of property in which he has no right, title, or interest"' has been
expanded by a number of courts to deny standing to object to anyone
245. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 263 (1960).
246. E.g., "Guests" and "invitees" had no standing. Gaskins v. United States, 218 F.2d
47, 48 (D.C. Cit. 1955); Gibson v. United States, 149 F.2d 381, 384 (D.C. Cir. 1945); n re
Nasetta, 125 F.2d 924(2d Cit. 1942). Nor did employees have standing, even though in
"control" or "occupancy" of premises if not in "possession." United States v. Conoscente, 63
F.2d 811 (2d Cit. 1933); Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F.2d 629, 630 (2d Cit. 1932). Generally,
the necessary interest has been described as "ownership in or right to possesion of the premises."
Jeffers v. United States, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
247. In Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 357, 366 (1960) Justice Frankfurter said: '"We
are persuaded ... that it is unnecessary and ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions,
developed and refined by common law in evolving the body of private property which, more
than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose validity is largely
historical.... Distinctions such as those between 'lessee,' 'licensee,' 'invitee' and 'guest,' often
only of gossamer strength, ought not to be determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately
referable to constitutional safeguards." Note, however, that private property concepts are
still important in determining who may give consent to a warrantless search. See discussion,
p. 81, supra.
248. Id. at 267.
249. United States v. McDaniel, 154 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1957); United States v. Lester,
21 F.R.D. 376 (D. Pa. 1957).
250. Annot., 50 A.L.R. 2d 577 (1956). Cf. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960);
United States v. Ong Goon Sing, 149 F. Supp. 267 (S.D. N.Y. 1957).
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claiming an interest in contraband on the ground that nobody can acquire
a legitimate property interest in such goods.251
However, the Supreme Court has made it clear that an accused who
claims an interest in contraband has standing to move to suppress such
evidence if illegally seized,252 "it being his property for purposes of the
exclusionary rule."25  But the property, being contraband, will not be
returned to the accused even though the motion to suppress is successful.254
Some lower federal courts, however, have distinguished between con-
traband, the possession of which, by its very nature, is illegal (i.e., nar-
cotics, burglary tools) and embezzled or stolen property, in which, but
for the manner in which it was obtained, one might have a legitimate
property interest.255
The cases considering embezzled 56 or stolen257 property have distin-
guished their facts from contraband on the ground that a thief acquires no
title to stolen property and consequently does not have sufficient standing
to object. Whether or not the Jones rule will affect this distinction re-
mains to be seen. 58
One who claims an interest in public documents, however, has been
treated with far less constitutional consideration than one who possesses
contraband. 9 "Records required by law to be kept in order that there
may be suitable information of transactions which are the appropriate
subjects of governmental regulation" cannot be the subject of illegal
search and seizure. Thus, a possessor of gasoline ration coupons,...
251. State v. Goldstein, 111 Ore. 221, 224 Pac. 1087 (1924); State v. Sabo, 108 Ohio St.
200, 140 N.E. 499 (1923); Rosansky v. State, 106 Ohio St. 442, 140 N.E. 370 (1922).
But cf. Work v. United States, 243 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (phial of narcotics illegally
seized held inadmissible); People v. Mayo, 19 Ill. 2d 136, 166 N.E.2d 440 (1960) (policy
slips held inadmissible even though contraband).
252. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S.
699 (1948).
253. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 54 (1951).
254. Ibid. See also Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), overruled on other
grounds, United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
255. United States v. Pete, 111 F. Supp. 292 (D.D.C. 1953); United States v. Friedman,
166 F. Supp. 786 (D.N.J. 1958).
256. United States v. Pete, 111 F. Supp. 292 (D.D.C. 1953).
257. United States v. Friedman, 166 F. Supp. 786 (D.N.J. 1958).
258. Certainly in cases in which the stolen or embezzled property is the essence of the charge,
the Jones rule would apply to permit the accused standing to move to suppress the evidence
if illegally obtained. In other cases, it would seem that the spirit of the Jones rule, which
decries the application of the law of private property to fourth amendment considerations,
would require the elimination of the different results in dealing with stolen property and
contraband.
259. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361
(1910).
260. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154 (1947); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S.
361, 380 (1910).
261. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946).
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forged government "draft" cards,2" 2 or even record books of a corporation
licensed to do business by the state263 has been held to have no standing
to object to what might otherwise be an illegal search or seizure. The
distinction between public and private papers, originally made in Wilson
v. United States 4 in a case involving a subpoena of corporate books, was
extended to the warrantless search... apparently on the basis that when
government officers demand such public documents, "the demand is one
of right,"2 6 since the property belongs to the government and not the
accused. 67
As our lives become more and more subject to governmental regula-
tion, as our business becomes more complex and record keeping more
intricate and widespread, the greater will be the opportunity for govern-
ment to violate with impunity the privacy of its citizens through the "pub-
lic documents" exception. Why should not this area be treated as con-
traband, where the possessor has even less legitimate property interest?
Why should the possessor of public documents illegally seized not have
an opportunity to have them suppressed but not returned to him, as in the
case of contraband?
The conduct of the accused on the witness stand may also have bear-
ing on whether or not he has standing to object to the introduction of
illegally seized evidence. It has been held that one who voluntarily testi-
fies to, and admits ownership of, the illegally seized evidence can no
longer object to its introduction.2"
WHAT IS THE SCOPE AND APPLICATION OF THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE?
Having examined illegal search and seizure under the exclusionary
rule and the persons who may assert it, it is important to consider some
of the ramifications of the rule and its use in court proceedings.
It may be stated generally that where illegally obtained evidence may
not be directly introduced in evidence under the exclusionary rule, it may
not be used indirectly against the accused either.269 This principle was
262. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154 (1947).
263. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1910).
264. 221 U.S. 361, 380 (1910).
265. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946).
266. Id. at 593.
267. The Court did "not suggest that officers seeking to reclaim government property may
proceed lawlessly and subject to no restraints," but it did not indicate under what circumstances
it might find a search for government documents to be lawless. Id. at 591.
268. Rao v. Texas, 160 Tex. Crim. 416, 271 S.W.2d 426 (1954); Burks v. State, 194 Tenn.
675, 254 S.W.2d 970 (1953); State v. Smith, 357 Mo. 467, 209 S.W.2d 138 (1948).
269. Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
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dearly established in the landmark decision of Silverthorne Lumber Co.
v. United States."' Defendants were arrested and taken into custody.
While they were detained, government agents, without a search warrant,
went to defendants' business office and confiscated all the books, papers,
and documents there. Upon defendants' motion to suppress and for re-
turn of the papers, the trial court found that they had been unconstitution-
ally seized. Whereupon the government agents returned the papers to
the defendants, but only after they had made copies of all the material
documents. A new indictment was framed based upon the knowledge
thus obtained and subpoenae were served upon the defendants specifying
with great detail the documents sought. (All of this detailed informa-
tion was obtained in the illegal search.) Defendants were convicted of
contempt for failure to respond to the subpoenae. The Supreme Court
reversed the conviction. Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court,
macerated the government's position 7 ' and laid down the proposition
which has been followed since:
The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a
certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used
before the Court but that it shall not be used at all.272 (Emphasis added.)
But, softening the rule somewhat, the Court continued:
Of course, this does not mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred
and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent
source they may be proved like any others .... F3
Thus evidence is inadmissible under the exclusionary rule not only
when obtained as the yield of an illegal search, but also if it results from
information derived from an illegal search. 74 Evidence resulting from
leads obtained through illegal wiretapping will be excluded as well. 75
And where evidence is excluded because it was illegally obtained, neither
270. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
271. "The proposition could not be presented more nakedly. It is that although of course
its seizure was an outrage which the Government now regrets, it may study the papers before
it returns them, copy them, and then may use the knowledge that it has gained to call upon
the owners in a more regular form to produce them; that the protection of the Constitution
covers the physical possession but not any advantages that the Government can gain over the
object of its pursuit by doing the forbidden act.... In our opinion such is not the law."
251 U.S. at 391-92.
272. Ibid.
273. Id. at 392.
274. Woo Lai Chun v. United States, 274 F.2d 708 (9th Cit. 1960); United States v.
Krulewitch, 167 F.2d 943 (2d Cir.), reed on other grounds, 336 U.S. 440 (1948); People
v. Martin, 382 III. 192, 46 NE.2d 997 (1942); Simmons v. State, 277 P.2d 196 (Okla.
1954).
275. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
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the oral testimony of the officers" 6 nor photographs of the excluded evi-
dence 7 will be admissible.
It has been held that even though evidence is excluded when offered
affirmatively, because it was illegally obtained, if the accused testifies af-
firmatively, broadly and beyond the bare denial of the elements of the
charge against him as to such evidence on direct examination, the evi-
dence may be introduced by the prosecution in rebuttal."8 But if the ac-
cused does not testify as to such evidence on direct examination, the prose-
cution may not introduce such evidence to impeach him, even though it
may have attempted to lay a foundation on cross-examination of the ac-
cused.m9 The rationale for this distinction apparently is that the accused
has waived his right to assert the protections of the fourth amendment in
the former case by voluntarily testifying in reliance upon the inadmissi-
bility of the illegally obtained evidence. He cannot "turn the illegal
method by which evidence was obtained to his own advantage and pro-
vide himself with a shield against contradiction of his untruths.'28 0 But
it has been indicated in dictum that if the denials of the accused on direct
examination are not so broad, but are limited to a bare denial of the ele-
ments of the charge against him, the illegally obtained evidence may not
be used to impeach him.2 '
CONCLUSION
The law of search and seizure and the historical development of the
exclusionary rule have been considered in some detail in this survey of
the field in the light of the expanded use of the exclusionary rule required
by the holding in Mapp v. Ohio.28' This was done primarily in an at-
tempt to collate the experience of the federal and other jurisdictions
which have followed the exclusionary rule prior to Mapp as an aid to
practitioners in the criminal law in dealing with the exclusionary rule for
the first time.
276. McGinnis v. United States, 227 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1955); Houston v. State, 113 So.2d
582 (Fla. App. 1959); Todd v. State, 233 Ind. 594, 122 N.E.2d 343 (1954); Smith v. State,
182 Tenn. 158, 184 S.W.2d 390 (1945).
277. Joyce v. State, 227 Miss. 854, 87 So. 2d 92 (1956).
278. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
279. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
280. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954).
281. "Of course, the Constitution guarantees a defendant the fullest opportunity to meet
the accusation against him. He must be free to deny all the elements of the case against him
without thereby giving leave to the Government to introduce by way of rebuttal evidence
illegally secured by it and therefore not available for its case in chief. Beyond that, however,
there is hardly a justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testi-
mony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility." 347 U.S. at 65.
282. 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961): "We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution, is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state
court."
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Furthermore, the experience in the federal and state jurisdictions
which have operated under the exclusionary rule should demonstrate
dearly to law enforcement agencies and to all who are disturbed by the
extension of the exclusionary rule that their alarm is needless. As Mr.
Justice Stewart has said in Elkins v. United States:28
The federal courts themselves have operated under the exclusionary rule
... for almost half a century; yet it has not been suggested either that
the Federal Bureau of Investigation has thereby been rendered ineffec-
tive, or that the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts
has thereby been disrupted.
It is particularly heartening to note the reaction of the California At-
torney General to the effects of the exclusionary rule upon law enforce-
ment there several years after California adopted the rule in People v.
Cahan: 284
The over-all effects of the Cahan decision ... have been excellent. A
much greater education is called for on the part of all peace officers of
California. As a result, I am confident they will be much better
police officers. I think there is more cooperation with the District At-
torneys and this will make for better administration of criminal jus-
tice.28
5
This attitude is in accord with the general position taken by no less an
authority than J. Edgar Hoover," 6 as to the necessity of coordinating
police action and constitutional rights.28 7
The cases have hammered out the necessary exceptions to the consti-
tutional requirement of a search warrant in order to provide police offi-
cers with realistic remedies in times of emergency and clear necessity. At
times we think the Court has gone too far in limiting the right of privacy,
for the benefit of police procedure.288
283. 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960).
284. 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
285. Excerpt from letter of Governor Edmund G. Brown, then Attorney General of Cali-
fornia, to the Stanford Law Review, quoted in Note, 9 STAN. L. REV. 515, 538 (1957). Cf.
Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches - A Comment on People v.
Cahan, 43 CAT. L. REV. 565, 586-88 (1955).
286. Director of Federal Bureau of Investigation.
287. "Our people may tolerate many mistakes of both intent and performance, but, with
unerring instinct, they know that when any person is intentionally deprived of his constitu-
tional rights those responsible have committed no ordinary offense. A crime of this nature,
if subtly encouraged by failure to condemn and punish, certainly leads down the road to
totalitarianism.
"Civil rights violations are all the more regrettable because they are so unnecessary. Pro-
fessional standards in law enforcement provide for fighting crime with intelligence rather than
force .. " F.B.I. Law Enforcement Bulletin, Sept. 1952, pp. 1-2.
288. Where the shoe has pinched, we have cried out throughout this article. And we are
not alone. See Stewart's opinion in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960):
"[Tihere are those who think that some of the Court's decisions have tipped the balance too
heavily against the protection of that individual privacy which it was the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment to guarantee."
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But there is a more positive and compelling reason, apart from the
negative argument that law enforcement will not disintegrate under the
Mapp rule, to urge the strengthening of the exclusionary rule even as its
use is geographically expanded. The requirements of freedom and the
right of privacy should weigh heavily in the balance where close fact situ-
ations are involved. As the above decisions demonstrate, the fourth
amendment protections are "still a sizeable hunk of liberty" '289 which we
must exert every effort to preserve.
Mapp v. Ohio "gives to the individual no more than that which the
Constitution guarantees him, to the police officer no less than that to
which honest law enforcement is entitled, and to the courts that judicial
integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice."2  But the
decision in Mapp v. Ohio is the beginning, not the end, of the struggle to
protect the constitutional right of each citizen to be let alone.
289. In United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306 (2d Cit. 1951), Judge Frank said in his
dissent: "A man can still control a small part of his environment, his house; he can retreat
hence from outsiders, secure in the knowledge that they cannot get at him without disobey-
ing the Constitution. That is still a sizeable hunk of liberty - worth protecting from en-
croachment. A sane, decent, civilized society must provide some such oasis, some shelter from
public scrutiny, some insulated enclosure, some enclave, some inviolate place which is a man's
castle." (Emphasis added). 193 F.2d at 315-16.
290. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
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